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PREFACE 
In line with the selected methodology, the Innovation Management 
Task at  TIASA is concentrating on sectors in an attempt to analyze the 
situation at  this level of the economy before making any aggregations or 
conclusions relevant to management. In order to properly cover indus- 
try, it was suggested that branches that are at  differing stages or that 
display different kinds of development be chosen for the study. Telecom- 
munications was recommended as a branch with u h  growth. 
This was the first in a series of task force meetings initiated to pro- 
mote an exchange of views among researchers and to coordinate the 
activities of individual collaborating institutions. 
A wide selection of issues for discussion are reviewed in the first 
paper (Vasko), whch was circulated to participants in advance. It deals 
with macroeconomic aspects as well as with sectoral policy issues 
relevant to innovation. 
Prof. Braun's paper deals with basic questions of information related 
to macroeconomic variables. It particularly points out the volatility of 
value concepts as related to information and some of its consequences. 
The papers that follow deal with the organizational and economic 
environment of telecommunications. This environment, which was stable 
for decades, has been disturbed recently by new technology, whch has 
brought with it new economies of scale, new demands, new organizational 
structures, new time horizons, etc. The paper by Dr. Mueller explores how 
this has changed the potential for competition in telecommunications. 
When asking for resources a t  a national level, proponents of telecom- 
munications often have to show that the sector can provide social returns 
comparable to or even higher than those offered by other branches com- 
peting for the same resources. Here it is not easy to make a convincing 
case ex ante, which becomes a dimculty especially when we have new ser- 
vices in mind. Similar difficulties are experienced by individual services 
within the telecommunications branch or even by individual users, as is 
shown in the paper by Dr. Puzman. No generally accepted methodology is 
in sight-case studies and their conclusions seem to be the only substi- 
tute. 
A similar problem is described and suggested for further research by 
John Page. He concentrates on the interaction of telecommunications 
and computer-based information technology. Many managerial and policy 
issues are generated by this interaction and by organizational and opera- 
tional dissimilarities of these two branches. 
The last four papers deal with the relation of telecommunications 
development to other branches and activities. Dr. Seetzen points out how 
different technological innovations can be "complementary" to each other 
in delivering a system capable of new services and/or in offering a new 
value to the user. 
Some potential applications (in information transfer) of these innova- 
tions are explored in the second paper by Mr. Page. He shows also how 
present tariff policies can hamper the acceptance of new services (for 
example electronic document delivery). 
The relations of telecommunications to the printing industry and its 
potential future development are explored in the paper by Prof. Kart- 
tunen. He shows how the progress of information technology in general 
and telecommunications in particular can influence the graphic arts 
industry and its progress, giving particular attention to the scene in Fin- 
land. 
An interesting attempt is made in the paper by Dr. Granstrand. He 
compares the innovation environment in two production branches in 
Sweden in which two innovated products have emerged recently--the 
automobile and telecommunication equipment branches. Ths com- 
parison serves as a vehicle for identifying similarities and differences in 
the process of innovation mangement with emphasis on capital formation. 
The last paper in the proceedings describes the result of research in 
videotex systems carried out a t  IIASA by Drs. Maurer and Sebestyen. The 
paper presents a technical and economic analysis of the present state- 
of-the-art and the potential future development of videotex systems with 
special attention to a comparison of one-way and two-way videotex sys- 
tems. The authors also try to identify the role of technical innovation of 
individual components in the system's development with due attention to 
human and societal factors. 
The paper presented by Mr. Nemeth on the use of viewdata systems 
for inventory control is not included in the proceedings but will be pub- 
lished as a collaborative paper by the institute at a later date. 
Tibor Vasko 
Task Leader 
Innovation Management Task 
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THE PRESENTATIONS 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE ISSUES* 
Tibor V a s k o  
Internationnl Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
1. In troduc t ion  
Telecommunication technology--despite its century-old history- can- 
not be labeled a mature industry. It is facing important new challenges 
generated by recent advances in technology. There have been major 
changes not only in the physical representation of messages and the 
media carrying them, but also in the nature of the messages being com- 
municated. Entire information packages are being added to private mes- 
sages; in the near future, it will be possible to transmit whole information 
and knowledge bases (Masuda 1972). 
Telecommunication enhanced by computers represents the core of 
information technology, which, it is believed, will stamp the character of 
future society. It is said that some societies are already reaching this 
stage (see Parker 1972). Gassmann (1981) has suggested that  informa- 
tion technology and services be considered a fourth economic sector. 
It seems that  every production technology that lent its name to a 
cultural era  in the past better obeyed the laws of economics than does 
information technology, whose economic and social impacts extend far 
beyond productivity and production of goods. The effects of information 
technology seem to be more mediated and indirect, and as a result, more 
difficult to  assess, even when they have been clearly identified. 
But this in itself, i.e., identifying the potential impacts (economic 
and social) of information technology, is very difficult. We might specu- 
late that  this might be because information is a companion of creativity. 
Even in the last century, i t  was clear to philosophers and economists that  
creativity defies the bookkeeping (cause and direct effect) character of 
the majority of economic theories. 
This encumbers with many uncertainties the exploration of the role 
of information in society and makes difficult the accurate forecasting of 
information demand. And it is from this demand that  one must deduce 
the demand on telecommunications. 
*In preperirlg this paper I was greatly assisted by the comments and suggestions of Alec Lee, 
Alvin Harman, Josef Puzman, Zsolt Naray, Miles Meriams, Patricia Dinneen, Gordon Thomp- 
son, Eric Burke, and other colleagues. 
While the following issues address more specific problems, all are 
related to the general task of acquiring new knowledge relevant to this 
distinctive sector. 
2. The Role of Telecommunications in the National Economy 
The easiest way to  assess the role of telecommunications in the 
national economy is to relate it to  the resources spent on it (inputs), in 
terms of both capital and labor. A random glance through the wealth of 
literature on telecommunications reveals a wide spectrum of data, some 
of which are somewhat contradictory, mostly because of differences in 
the methodologies used or in the application of definitions. 
Gill (1975) estimates that in the late 1960s investments in telecom- 
munications by PlTs and other carriers ranged from 0.45% to 0.90% of the 
GDPs of the US, Sweden, the UK and France. In the total of all invest- 
ments (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) the share of telecommunications 
in this period ranged from 1.7% in France to 4.0% in the United Kingdom. 
This growth trend seems to have continued in the 1970s; a t  the s m e  
time differences among countries have been narrowing. Dondoux 
(1977) claims that in several countries the share of telecommunica- 
tions in the GDP has exceeded 10%. 
The cost of telecommunication in business is also Q h .  Kimball 
(1977) indicates that in 1974 DM 22 billion were spent in the FRG on busi- 
ness communications comprising telephones, correspondence, telexing, 
and business travel. When related expenses for personnel and equipment 
are included, the amount reaches 12.5 billion (13% of the GNP). Of this 
sum, 37% is spent on telecommunications, 41% on correspondence. 
The labor input is also considered very important. Early in the his- 
tory of telecommunications it was recognized that  some technologies 
(manual telephone switching, for example) were so labor-intensive that a 
limited labor supply could hamper the development of the whole sector. 
This provided a strong motivation for innovation and led to increased sub- 
stitution of capital for labor. Now labor input is no longer a constraint in 
the telecommunications sector. 
The transmission of information has become very emcient. Perhaps 
this-together with the general tendency S. Nora calls "l'informatization" 
of society--has contributed to the major shift of the working population 
toward information handling activities. In his widely known study, Porat 
(1977) pointed out that 50% of the US civllian labor force is engaged in 
information-intensive activities and that 46% of the US GNP is derived 
from the production, processing, and distribution of information goods 
and services. 
Should information handling (recent computers) proceed the same 
way as information transmission (telecommunications) did several 
decades before it, one could conclude that it needs substantial innova- 
tion. 
Telecommunications have a significant share in all research and 
development activities. In most countries the financial resources devoted 
to this activity (as a percentage of sales) is hgher than in most other 
industries (except computers).' In the US, for example, the percentage is 
twice as high as for manufacturing industry as a whole (Agnew, Romeo 
1981). 
While there may be differences among countries in the levels of 
inputs to the telecommunications sector, there seems to be a general 
trend toward hgher  shares in the use of resources. 
The increased importance of modern telecommunications has led t o  
the introduction of the notion of an electronic infrastructure in the 
national economy whose major component is telecommunications. Kapi- 
tonov (1980) contends that in the CMEA countries telecommunications is 
part of an emerging international production infrastructure. The 
management of a modern economy requires many coordinated but locally 
decentralized decisions for which computers and telecommunications are  
indispensable. In the USSR some estimates were made of how many 
arithmetic calculations are required per year in the process of managing 
the national economy during the 1960s. The result was #10 sup 16# 
(Glushkov 1974). 
As for the society as a whole, related data on information handling 
capability were given by R.N. Noyce (1977), who concluded that there are  
50,000 electronic logic functions per capita in use in the US, and that this 
may grow by a factor of 10 in the next five years. This might lead to a 
situation in which each person could command the capabilities of a 
powerful computer. 
These considerations do not take into account indirect, secondary, 
and difficult-to-assess effects of the widespread use of information tech- 
nology made possible by the availability of telecommunications, such as 
the enhancement of the creativity of users, the increase in the efficiency 
of the education process, etc.. 
Certain impediments appear to be inherent in efforts to  identify the 
impact of this technology, because as it is correctly argued by G.B. 
Thompson (1979), not only is information as an economic good different 
from other goods, but the technology connected with i t  is also unique. If 
we forget this fact we may miss the main specific contribution of this 
technology (much as did the one who discovered that  when photographic 
plates a re  kept close to discharge tubes, they become black and that it 
might be better to store them elsewhere--to Roentgen this same informa- 
tion was sufficient to  discover x-rays.) 
3. Innovation Potential in Telecommunications and Its Source 
The cost/performance ratio of modern electronic components has 
led to innovative equipment and services in the telecommunications sec- 
tor. A case in point is the high rate of penetration of LSI/VLSI-based 
semi-conductor components in telecommunications equipment. Detailed 
studies reveal that  microcircuits have been incorporated into the design 
of virtually every major category of telecommunications device (Melvin 
198O), including: 
high feature telephone sets (with custom-made microproces- 
sors) 
multiple-line key telephone equipment 
voice/data terminal equipment 
private automatic branch exchange (PABX) switching systems 
subscriber loop multiplex systems 
central office switching systems 
inter-office line and microwave digital transmission systems 
LSI circuits frequently combine analog and digital functions in a sin- 
gle device. This reflects the trend toward replacing analog signals with 
digital ones at  the component level, a trend also seen at the equipment 
and network levels. Worldwide shipments of modems amounted to nearly 
400,000 units in 1978; 1,200,000 units are projected for 1983. This indi- 
cates an annual growth rate of approximately 25%. 
As remote devices become more reliable, the technological trend is 
toward a decentralization of control in telecommunications networks 
through an increasing amount of remote intelligence. Improvements in 
telecommunication technology include digital encoding and digital signal 
transmission and processing (PCM, delta), greater efficiency in communi- 
cation media capacity sharing, new switching techniques, fiber optics, and 
satellite transmission. 
Satellites have developed very rapidly since their appearance in 
1960. Fourteen commercial communication satellites were placed in sta- 
tionary orbit in the 1970s and it is estimated that nearly 100 additional 
satellites were in orbit at the beginning of 1981. There has been a 50-fold 
increase in communication satellite capacity with a corresponding 
decrease in cost per circuit per year since the first stationary communi- 
cations satellite was launched. Bell Telephone Laboratories expects world 
traffic to reach 2,000,000 satellite circui& by the year 2000. 
Compared with classical copper wire systems, fiber optic transmis- 
sion systems offer large information capacity, greater protection against 
interception, low error rate (due to freedom from cross talk and electri- 
cal radiation), and low cost. However, optical fibers still require special 
handling and cannot yet fully replace copper wires. The price of fiber 
optic cable is dropping rapidly: according to a 1979 study by Probe 
Research, Inc., the price was expected to have declined from US $13,000 
per kilometer in 1978 to  U S  $6,700 in 1901. It was predicted that the 
price of fiber optic cables would drop below the price of copper cables by 
the end of 1981 at the latest. 
There is an increasing movement toward the integration of communi- 
cation services. This involves integration of functions, e.g., the integra- 
tion of transmissions with switching techniques and devices, and will even- 
tually enable a unifled computer controller network to  transmit voice, 
video, data, and facsimile and in this way, to  integrate services as well. 
This will eliminate the clear technical distinction between telecommuni- 
cations and computer services. 
4. Sectoral Efficiency 
The rate of increase in productivity in the telecommunications sec- 
tor is considered to be above the average rate for all industries and ser- 
vices. For example, in the FRG, productivity in the telecommunications 
branch (in terms of traffic volume per employed person) increased sixfold 
between 1950 and 1975. (See Elias 1876.) Overall productivity in the FRG 
nearly doubled during the same time span, taking into account all factors 
involved in production. Data from the US convey a similar picture 
(Agnew, Romeo 1981). 
Capital formation plays an important role in the telecommunications 
sector. Flgures vary from country to country, but in general, the share of 
telecommunications is hgh .  Elias (1976) for example, states that the 
German Federal Post Office made investments corresponding to one-sixth 
of all investment in industry in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The telecommunications sector manifests many natural economies 
of scale that affect the policies and regulations of firms (regulation of 
monopolies) and governmental agencies within the sector. Whether or 
not a new technology is introduced will largely depend on the extent to 
which it can take advantage of economies of scale. 
Innovative capacity is also dependent on the size of the firm or the 
degree of concentration within the branch. The degree of concentration 
that is optimal for eliciting creative behavior has not yet been esta- 
blished. 
A n  important question that has been studied elsewhere is what is the 
impact of R & D on productivity and on the efficiency of telecommunica- 
tions. Ths question is difficult to answer conclusively for any sector; in 
the telecommunication sector, whch is not easily amenable to standard 
classification and data collection schemes, it is even more difficult. In 
addition, regulation makes the real impact difficult to assess. Rates of 
return on innovations in this sector are very low, perhaps because regula- 
tion prevents companies from appropriating the gains of innovative activi- 
ties (Griliches 1980). This may discourage innovators. 
5. Selection Environment 
Innovation, the modification of a particular service or product or the 
introduction of a new one, is largely dependent on economic and social 
environment. In telecommunications the decision to innovate must be 
based on consideration of a number of factors that are not always present 
in other sectors. 
This makes predicting success very risky: CB radio succeeded 
beyond all expectations, for example, while Picturephone lagged far 
behind. Some researchers argue (see tor example Thompson 1979) that 
in telecommunications only those innovations that have direct effects of 
the first order and which are related to  cost reduction are accepted. 
Such innovations lead to an intensification of existing processes. Exten- 
sive innovations involving impacts of a higher order do not seem to work. 
Knowledge about t h s  is still very inadequate. 
The worldwide telecommunications system with its more than 500 
million telephones is the largest man-made machine, a machine that 
should be designed to meet the criteria of effectiveness and reliability. 
The implementation of any technological change in this system must take 
into account 
amortization requirements of equipment currently in use 
the compatibility of the technical innovation with the rest of the 
network 
the revenue requirements of the new technology 
the needs of the user 
policy regulations 
personnel requirements (increased or decreased) and training 
the market situation, standards, CCITT recommendations, etc. 
These factors create an environment that complicates the selection 
of a particular innovation from the set of potentially available ones. A 
new consideration has been added quite recently: the consumption of 
energy and resources by new telecommunication services. An overview of 
the relevance of this criterion is given by Maurer, Rauch, and Sebestyen 
(1982). 
6. The Relation of Telecornrnunications to Other Sectors 
The telecommunications sector has close links with other sectors of 
the national economy, especially manufacturing, and particularly in 
recent years, the computer industry. Telecommunications makes it pos- 
sible for users to access remote data bases and also facilitates the crea- 
tion of distributed data processing networks. 
Microelectronic components have functionally replaced electro- 
mechanical devices and hard-wired control, increasing telecommunica- 
tions' flexibility and reliability, as well as improving its performance /cost 
ratio, especially from the point of view of service vendors. 
As the price of energy has increased, telecommunications has 
become a potential instrument for promoting energy conservation, by 
improving the efficiency of transport, and in some cases, by partially 
replacing it. Energy saving has become one of the objectives of innova- 
tion and policy design in telecommunication (Day 1978). 
The effects of telecommunications are also felt in the administrative 
branch, where the so-called "electronic office" may radically change the 
way offices operate. The "office of the future" features 
teletex service for inter-office correspondence (with high 
transmission rate, ISO-7 codes, automatic distribution, and 
automated receiving) 
electronic mail, based on computer control and processing, with 
"store and forward capability" 
centralized filing, with remote file access 
teleconferencing, etc. 
The introduction of electronic fund transfers will have a significant 
impact on banking, and will create new problems of reliability, privacy, 
security, etc. 
7. The Policy Issues 
The specific properties of telecommunication named above are mak- 
ing the design of an optimal policy (assuming we know what the criterion 
for optimality is) very difficult. These properties seem to trigger off pol- 
icy issues unlike those economist and policy makers are accustomed to 
facing. 
Telecommunications are regulated in virtually every country, 
although there are significant policy differences among nations. The old- 
est regulations affecting the telephone industry are in the US, where 
rate-level regulation is used. The limited range of this regulation has 
been acknowledged and discussed for more than half a century. New and 
hopefully better methods are now being sought, but the diversification of 
telecommunication services makes the choice difficult. In addition, regu- 
lators are faced with a lack of sufficient information (Ryan 1981). 
One could list several recent changes in the nature of telecommuni- 
cations that have increased both the importance and complexity of policy 
issues. What was once an established regulated monopoly has now 
become one of an expanding set of related technologies. The character of 
the demand for telecommunications has also been changing. For quite 
some time it was homogeneous in nature; now it is becoming more and 
more diversified. There are new uncertainties caused by new technolo- 
gies and system patterns. There are uncertainties about econo@es of 
scale. The boundary lines between systems are becoming more uneven 
and less well defined than before. New technology is also causing a proli- 
feration of substitute equipment, which is creating competitive alterna- 
tives where these forces were once relatively small. 
Telecommunications policy issues inevitably involve economic 
matters. Social aspects are becoming increasingly involved as well. Ideal 
perhaps, would be to identify and implement innovations that are techni- 
cally possible, economically attractive, and socially useful. But such an 
accomplishment would be very difficult, perhaps infeasible. Instead the 
problem may be one of trade-offs. 
Some important technical policy problems relate to standards. In 
telecommunications, where the exchange of information involves not only 
interstate links but also international ones, standards (generally esta- 
blished as CCITT recommendations) become essential and are not entirely 
within national control. These standards apply to interfaces a t  the bord- 
ers, and include performance capability. 
A t  the level of the national economy, the policy issues include 
the management of the telecommunications sector development 
in the scope of the national economy 
the priority to be given to telecommunications in the economic 
and social development of a country 
what services to introduce, and when to do so; what measures to 
use to stimulate development in the desired direction 
how to do this in a technically "turbulent" environment, in which 
many decisions are burdened with risk 
Important social issues includes the effect of telecommunications on 
lifestyles 
labor force, jobs, etc. 
crime control 
privacy 
As important as the formulation of policies are the instruments for 
implementing them. This is important because many new telecommuni- 
cation services (e.g., services aimed a t  educating or at  enhancing public 
participation) are not compatible with the traditional market. 
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SOME REMARKS ON THE ECONOMICS OF 1NFOFtlMI"I'ON 
Ernes t  Braun  
lhLiversity of  Aston in Birmingham 
1. Introduct ion 
A high and increasing proportion of total economic activity in 
advanced countries is related to  the creation, manipulation and dissemi- 
nation of information. If we are to  believe that we are becoming an infor- 
mation society, then information must be at  the very heart of our 
economic activity. Yet our understanding of basic economic relationshps 
with regard to information is infinitely poorer than that for other subjects 
of economic activity, such as the production and marketing of manufac- 
tured goods or of primary products. The present paper considers some of 
the obstacles to our understanding and aims to suggest some avenues 
towards overcoming them. 
If we regard information as a trading commodity, as in many ways we 
must, it becomes immediately obvious that it has some curious proper- 
ties, of which we shall list but a few. 
i. Information is difficult to define and covers a multitude of sins, 
from tables of logarithms to Shakespearian drama. 
ii. It may be hard to measure the cost of production of informa- 
tion, yet to measure the benefit (or cost) of consumption is well 
nigh impossible. 
iii. lnformation is a free good in the sense that the resource 
remains undiminished after its consumption, yet its exclusive 
possession is frequently highly prized (see e.g., Taylor and 
Silberston, 1973). 
iv. Much information is created in the public sector, often as a pub- 
Lic good, and there is great unease at the boundary between 
public and private activities. 
v. As the value of output is impossible to define, so the efficiency 
and productivity of the whole information sector must remain 
undefined. In view of the fact that this sector comprises more 
than half the economy (Porath 1977), lack of knowledge about 
its productivity might be regarded as a serious deficiency. 
2. Definitions of In format ion  
In what we might call the statistical definition of information, any dis- 
tribution of any quantity which differs from the expected distribution 
conveys information. A written word contains information because the 
letters describing it are not randomly distributed. On the other hand, 
information on an individual event or item is conveyed by describing its 
position in a distribution; e.g., a person's income is information even 
when the income distribution is known and therefore, under some condi- 
tions, a statement of the average earnings of a large number of individu- 
als contains no new information. The descriptions of the color of eyes or 
hair in a European passport makes sense, in a Chinese or Indian or Ugan- 
dan passport it is meaningless. Ths treatment of information has a great 
deal of utility in thermodynamics and in economics (see e.g., Sommerfeld 
1956 and Theil 1967), but i t  tells us little about the economics of informa- 
tion. Besides, it tells us very little about many types of information whch 
play an important role in our economic activities. 
An alternative definition of information is "an input whch alters the 
probability distribution of events in the perception of an individual or an 
organization". In simple though less accurate words, information is some- 
thing that reduces uncertainty, although it might also increase it. There 
must be doubt about the general validity of this definition, because it 
leaves out some important categories of information. 
3. Types of Information 
A. Strictly factual and expressed in numbers or other symbols--with 
small amount of text sufficient to make the symbols meaningful 
(though sometimes requiring a good deal of background knowledge), 
e.g., 
Actual weather over past period 
Airline bookings 
Mathematical tables 
Library card index 
Railway timetables 
B. Factual and expressed in numbers or symbols, but with complex 
explanations, definitions and methods of measurement, sometimes 
involving theoretical relationships whch cast doubt upon the validity 
of the facts, e.g., 
Distribution of income 
Composition of chemicals 
Gross national product 
C.  Simple information of type B (or occasionally A) but projected into 
the future and thus entailing varying degrees of uncertainty. 
D. Simple factual information in words, though these are often used in a 
Pickwickian sense, meaningful only to the initiated, e.g., 
Theatre programmes 
Sales catalogues 
Lists of parts 
E. Topographical mformation in principIe expressible in numbers and 
symbols, but comprehensible only in visual images because of the 
high density of information required for an adequate description. 
Examples might include: 
Anatomical atlas 
Maps 
Drawings of parts 
Photographs of landscape, people or objects 
F. Verbal information of h g h  factual content where relationships 
between parts of a system or situation described are as important as 
the parts themselves and are required to give meaning to the 
description as a whole. Depending on the complexity of the system, 
there can be a high degree of selectivity and therefore some variabil- 
ity of interpretation of the facts. Examples might be: 
A description of the management structure of a large firm 
Most papers in scientific journals 
Factual reports in newspapers 
G. Similar to F, but with a shift of emphasis from factual description to 
interpretation, opinion and forecasting, e .g., 
Leading articles in newspapers 
Many papers in social science journals 
H. Texts mainly intended for entertainment or the contemplation of 
broad relationships, e.g., 
Literature 
Drama 
I. Similar to H (or sometimes F) but catering either entirely or addi- 
tionally to the sense of hearing or of vision, e.g., 
Music 
Film 
Theatre 
J. Skill--information whch can only be acquired by practice and whch 
cannot be fully conveyed by any information medium. 
Information is clearly a multi-variable activity and a proper description 
would require placing a particular type of information in a segment of a 
multidimensional space. Some of the variables of such a space might be: 
Size of audience 
Accuracy and reliability 
Temporal qualities 
Relevance to economic activity 
Pleasure 
Consensus over quality 
Originality 
Ease of access 
Perhaps the most important classification of information may divide 
it into just three classes according to end use. 
i. Information as an  item of final consumption 
ii. Information as a n  input to  other economic activity 
iii. Information as an  input to other non-economic activity 
Examples of the first type would include artistic and entertainment 
activities. We read a novel for the pleasure of it; the 'consumption' is an 
end in itself. The second type clearly includes all information activities 
within a fkm, such as planning, accountancy, personnel records, 
research, legal activities. The third category is perhaps less important 
and would include such items as reading holiday brochures with the pur- 
pose of planning a holiday, although clearly an economic activity by the 
operator is involved; the client's final consumption is the holiday and not 
the brochure. 
One problem that arises out of t h s  classification is serendipity. Infor- 
mation obtained without any intention of economic utilization, say an  
observation made on holiday, may trigger off a train of thought leading to 
the establishment of a new business. It is this 'browsing' quality of our 
intake of information and the amazingly tortuous ways in which cir- 
cumstances audacious to a particular activity arise that make it impossi- 
ble for any information system to be perfect. For we can, a t  best, only 
supply known needs--new needs arise out of new constellations. There is a 
kaleidoscopic, foraging quality about our intake of information, whch 
runs counter to all systematic attempts a t  designing perfect information 
systems. In this sense, and this sense only, we must agree with Hayek 
(1945), when he speaks of the irreplaceable information on "cir- 
cumstances of time and place" whch militates against centralized sys- 
tems. 
We must, however reluctantly, reach the conclusion that a high pro- 
portion of information cannot be given an economic value--it is truly 
priceless--and yet it is such freely circulating information coupled with 
the imaginative observer whch  makes the cultural, social, and economic 
wheels turn  round. We must regard the free availability of a vast variety 
of information as a public good of utmost importance. If the world is a 
stage, then a kaleidoscopic shfting pattern of information is the back- 
drop needed to  unfold the play. 
Having thus opted out of giving an economic value to  much of the 
most valuable information activities, we must turn  to those items which 
can be valued more effectively. 
4. The Economic Value of Some Information 
If we define value as the total price the market is willing to pay for a 
particular item of information, as we must, we run into three difficulties. 
The first is the definition of an  item of information. We shall side-step this 
by taking an item as whatever package the information comes in: a 
consultant's report, a book, a journal article, a balance sheet, a patent. 
The second difficulty arises out of the possibility of multiple sales. A book 
may sell in thousands of copies over many years; a licence to use a patent 
may bring royalties over the life of the patent; the consultant's report is 
the only one of our examples which is sold once only, somewhat like a 
material good. The third difficulty is the ease of piracy. A journal article 
can be copied many times over and despite all the legal niceties, the pho- 
tocopier and the tape recorder really have made nonsense of some 
proprietary rights in information. 
Because of the above difficulties, we must distinguish between three 
kinds of value: 
i. The total price the market is willing to pay for the information- 
we call it the total market value. 
ii. The total value the originator of the information can appropriate 
to himself--we call it the proprietary value. 
iii. The indeterminate and intangible value of the item of informa- 
tion as an economic input. 
We must now examine the various categories of information for cri- 
teria which give them economic value. 
Taking the category of information intended as items of h a 1  con- 
sumption, there is no doubt that the value of the information is related to 
one property and one property only--popularity. If we examine the total 
market value of a book, a song, a symphony, a poem, or a play, it is 
related purely and simply to the price individual consumers are prepared 
to pay and the number of such consumers (Thompson, 1981). 
The proportion of the total market value appropriated by the origina- 
tor, the proprietary value, varies greatly. It is zero for a long dead author 
or composer, millions for the best selling author or song-writer, and very 
little for the author of a learned treatise. The message is indeed not the 
medium. For while a pirated tape may contain the same message as the 
legitimate one, the ratio of market value to proprietary value becomes 
infinity. Similarly, the marginal utility of re-calculating a log table or re- 
writing Othello is zero, yet re-printing of these may be an entirely sound 
commercial proposition. 
We postulated that the market value of information as an item of 
final consumption is related to its popularity. But popularity is one way of 
expressing perceived relevance, a consensus on h g h  relevance, and we 
shall argue that relevance is a major criterion in determining the value of 
all information. 
If perceived relevance is to be a major criterion for assigning value 
to information, we must examine the concept in a little more detail. 
Clearly the marginal utility or relevance of knowledge of a source of pot- 
able water is infinite to  the man dying of thirst and very small to the aver- 
age city dweller. This is a case where the marginal utility of information 
leading to a commodity is closely related to the marginal utility of the 
commodity itself. We can generalize from this commonplace example to 
say that the value of information used as an input to an economic activity 
is closely related to the value of the activity itself and to the importance 
the information plays in it. Thus if I expect to make a million pounds out 
of manufacturing and selling a superior mousetrap, a patent covering its 
design may be worth quite a lot to me, as may be the knowledge of some 
quirk in the behavior of mice which makes my trap work. On the other 
hand, all information on the mating habits of mice may be quite 
irrelevant and worthless, as may be many hundreds of patents covering a 
variety of designs of mousetraps. This is blindingly obvious until we 
consider a major difficulty (apart from the obvious one that  my market 
estimate may be wrong)--how do I know which patent and which quirk of 
behavior are important to me? If we exclude the possibility of divine gui- 
dance, two ingredients are  essential--I must read widely about mice and 
about methods of controlling them and I must connect two previously 
unconnected items of information, the patent and the quirk of behavior of 
mice. 
Trivial as the above example may be, it highlights the difficulties of 
making information relevant and therefore valuable. Not only do we not 
know the utility of an item of information till after we have consumed it; 
we often only know it when, by some chance or creative act,  we have 
brought the item of information into a constellation of other factors in 
which it may play a key role. The marginal utility of an item of informa- 
tion depends on circumstances of time, place, conditions, and other 
items of previously unrelated information. We may have to absorb 
maises of irrelevant information in the hope of finding something we 
need, often not knowing in advance what it is we need. 
The price we should be willing to  pay for an item of information is 
related to our expectation of the economic return we may derive from it. 
The real utility of the information may range from full certainty ( I  know 
that I need the instruction manual for a machine in order to use it) to 
total uncertainty. The cost of consumption of information* may thus 
range from a necessarily incurred cost to a hghly speculative invest- 
ment. 
I t  is the reduction of uncertainty of relevance which is the main task 
of information services and consultants. The most common situation for 
a consumer of economically useful information is the knowledge that  what 
he needs exists somewhere, hidden amongst hundreds of thousands of 
words and a myriad of tables. Sifting and preparing the information for B 
particular perceived need--possibly making some judgment on its reliabil- 
ity as well--is the economic activity of the information scientist. This task 
is made much more difficult by the sheer mass of information available 
and computers were supposed to make the sifting so much easier, but we 
must greatly doubt whether they have helped substantially. The 
consultant's fees must be regarded as part of the cost of consumption of 
information, as are  all the mechanical or electronic aids for dealing with 
it. Information sufTers a high degree of congestion costs. 
5. Dissemination of Information 
The mode of dissemination of information varies with the number of 
people to whom it is relevant and with the temporal qualities of the infor- 
mation. Thus general news is broadcast not only because it is relevant to 
a large number of people, but also because it is ephemeral--words writ on 
the television screen. Similarly relevant but more or less permanent 
information, the durable of the information business, is recorded in what 
we might loosely describe as handbooks: tables of physical constants, 
collections of laws and regulations, telephone directories, Who is Who. .. .. 
*I a m  indebted to Stuart Macdonald for drawing my attention t o  this important concept, 
which includes the cost of reading, storing and marshallug the informlation concerned. 
The aim of systems like 'Prestel' is to bring information of varying 
durability, relevant to large numbers of people, onto the television 
screen. If updating needs to be done fairly frequently, it is much cheaper 
than re-printing handbooks. If the information is truly readily available 
through clever algorithms, then its use is more convenient than that of 
handbooks normally found only in libraries, and a larger range of infor- 
mation of varying degrees of fleetingness, from news to theatre pro- 
grammes to railway timetables to the Oxford Dictionary, can be incor- 
porated. This activity could be wealth-creating if, and only if, the price 
paid by the customers for the use of the information is hgher  than the 
cost of providing the service. 
The economics of a selective broadcasting system thus depends on a 
critical balance between the cost, the convenience of use, and the per- 
ceived relevance of the available material. The outcome must be 
regarded as indeterminate a t  this stage, but the factors which will deter- 
mine it are clearly discernible. 
By the very nature of a selective broadcasting system, only some 
types of information can be disseminated in t h s  way. In fact, only the 
types we have called A and D (simple factual) are readily amenable to this 
treatment; other categories would only exceptionally be considered. 
Without wishing to belittle the importance of types A and D of information, 
it is clear that only a small segment of the totality of information can be 
fully computerized in this way. Furthermore, only such information 
which is relevant to large numbers of people can be broadcast. Thus we 
are left with vast amounts of information which cannot be economically 
disseminated by systems such as 
Computer information systems need not, of course, work in conjunc- 
tion with a broadcasting system. Indeed perhaps the most important 
applications 'Bre within commercial organizations where stock control, 
accounts, lists of parts, machine scheduling, patent files, design data, and 
much other information are held on computer and made accessible on 
display devices withn the organization, possibly in widely dspersed loca- 
tions. The economic value of this type of activity is extremely hard to 
gauge. Because the information is not an item of final consumption and 
because the quantity and quality of information required are indeter- 
minate, the economic value remains indeterminate. A balance must be 
struck between such items as: how much time is saved by providing the 
information in one form rather than in another; how much value does the 
information add to the final product; what is the cost of collecting, hold- 
ing and disseminating the information; what is the cost of unnecessary 
use of the information; what is the degree of certainty of relevance; is 
serendipity catered for and, if so, at  what ratio of actual cost to likely 
benefit? The possibilities of answering these questions range from 
diEcult to impossible; yet we must know these answers if we are to optim- 
ise, in the economic sense, an internal information system. 
Even the systems of the kind described above will cater mostly for 
information needs in categories A and D, though B,C, and some of E and F 
can be added. The main problems concerning these types are access 
through suitable classifications and algorithms, cost effectiveness, and 
catering for serendipity. Certainty of relevance can be high for 
information with high factual content. The types of information sug- 
gested on pp. 3-4 can be examined from that point of view and we find 
that types A to F can be readily ranked by a potential consumer into a 
few simple categories of relevance. The more verbal and speculative the 
information becomes, the more difficult it is to rank it into relevance. 
This point is crucial, for the marginal utility of incurring the costs of con- 
sumption of information is proportional to its relevance. Hence so much 
effort is devoted to computerized access to types of information which 
are not readily amenable to this treatment. Can we really guess the 
relevance of a Ph.D thesis from the pathetic little list of key words? 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
1. The term information is too broad and ill defined to be treated by a 
single theoretical approach. Several ways of classifying information 
have therefore been suggested. 
2. There is no new economic problem in relation to information as an 
item of final consumption,'except that new technology has caused 
new difficulties in the appropriation of a proprietary share of the 
market value. Some information activities--and much educational 
activity falls into this category--are items of final consumption, yet 
are also a general input into economic activity. This type of informa- 
tion must be regarded as an essential public good and its free availa- 
bility is vital to the functioning of the economy. 
3. The economic value of information used as an intermediate input 
into economic activity depends upon its relevance and the market 
value of the final product. Much information of this kind is produced 
in the service sector and sold at a known price; much is also pro- 
duced internally within organizations at a calculable cost. The 
assignment of benefits from such information is problematic. 
4. Computers can help to improve access to some types of information 
and, depending upon its relevance, can help in selective broadcast- 
ing. Large categories of information elude ttus treatment. 
5. The cost of consumption of information can be high and there are 
considerable congestion costs associated with it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, the results of a larger report on the 
potential competition in the telecommunications sector is 
summarized and expanded upon. It is suggested that an increased 
use of market allocation could be pursued, especially for 
terminal equipment. Under certain conditions the PTT should be 
able to participate in this market as well. 
The paper stops short of suggesting outright competition in 
the network. First, because the issue requires further analysis, 
second, its implementation would be very difficult to carry out 
in Western Europe, given the current institutional arrangement. 
Some form of network competition--in the form of shared use, 
resale and value-added networks (VAN) should be permitted, 
however. 
We first look at the increasing application of telecommuni- 
cation services and discuss the potential for competition, as 
it is apparent from the recent experience in the USA. A 
discussion on the benefits of competition--even in publically 
regulated or publically owned sectors follows. Then the 
potential for network and terminal equipment competition is 
discussed in detail and rules for such competition are developed. 
This includes some role for the (traditional European) PTT in 
such a more competitive environment, including both constraints 
on conduct and a move towards a more cost oriented tariff 
structure. 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 
Telecommunications refers to electronic signal transmission 
between senders and receivers with the possibility for instant 
feedback (conversation). This potential may not always be used, 
but it is nevertheless an important distinction from one-way 
electronic communications, like public broadcasting. It implies 
a need for input and output devices on tfie sending and receiving 
end (terminal equipment) and for transmission equipment between 
them. Since transmission, for economic reasons, usually occurs 
over a network, rather than a sinsle dedicated line between 
individual participants, switching is important as well. While 
in the past such telecommunication networks have been used for 
single purposes only (such as voice, via the telephone network, 
or telex) it is important to note that today, many other input 
and output devices are possible 'for such information-carrying 
media as data, text and image. The traditional human voice 
and listening capability is therefore only one of the many 
input and output devices. 
To summarize the telephone system normally consists of: 
1. Transmission facilities, including all local lines 
and cables--local outside plant--and long-haul equip- 
ment--trunk cables, microwave links, repeaters, 
satellites and earth stations, electro-optical devices, 
and other advanced media--and the related carrier and 
multiplexing gear. 
2. A hierarchy of switching centers which include local, 
trunk and international exchanges, as well as private 
automatic branch exchanges (P.A.B.X.). 
3. Subscriber apparatus or terminals, mainly including 
mainstation telephones, but also other input and output 
devices, such as teleprinters, visual display units, 
facsimile devices, communication typewriters, etc., 
and modems for signal conversion. * 
Telecommunications has traditionally been seen as a natural 
monopoly sector. By this we mean that the cost-minimising 
industry structure serving a particular market is a single 
firm. **  For this reason, telecommunications services have been 
shielded from competition; they have been either publicly 
regulated private enterprise services, or, as is especially 
common in Europe, run by State-Owned Enterprises, commonly 
called PTTs. Historically speaking, most of the national 
telephone services have originally been established through 
licences from the relevant local authorities to equipment 
manufaqturers, who were vertically integrated, providing this 
service as well (Altman, 1 9 7 7 ) .  Because of the natural monopoly 
argument, and also because of the strategic role of national 
telecommunications services, the role of the State in these 
sectors has been very dominant, and competition has only been 
allowed to take place within a very restricted framework. 
*In addition to this fixed-plant telephone and telegraph equipment, 
there are also mobile radio systems--often connected to the 
terminal end for paging or radio telephone services. Radio 
dispatch systems also belong to this group, even though they 
may be private, insular systems. 
**However, see Baumol, 1978 for a more thorough definition. 
INCREASING SIGNS OF COMPETITION 
Vertical ÿ is integration 
Whilst in the past, and especially in the U.S. and Canada, 
vertically integrated structures, (which comprise equipment 
producers and network operators, as for example, the Bell 
System but also GTE and Bell Canada-Northern Telecom) have 
been the dominant form of industrial organization, recent 
attempts to reduce the foreclosure created through vertical 
integration are apparent. The Court proceedings in the most 
important case (USR vs. ATT, 1978) will result in substantial 
vertical disintegration. In other instances an increased 
separation between network operation and equipment manufacturing 
is already becoming apparent. * 
In Europe, except where equipment manufacturers are also 
network operators under licence from their respective Governments 
(for example, until very recently Spain, Italy and before the 
War in Hungary and Poland, etc.), this issue of vertical in- 
tegration has never been important. Instead, the network 
operators have been separated from the equipment manufacturers, 
even though they have at times had almost a quasi-vertical 
relationship. They usually relied on a number of trusted 
national suppliers, so that these markets were*gretty well closed 
off too, both nationally, and internationally. 
*See the ITT-GTE Consent Decree, for example. 
**The British term for this relationship is "The King", in 
German it is called a System of Court Suppliers--"Hofliefer- 
anten". 
But even here the EEC is' attempting to open the markets at 
least European-wide.* 
Terminal Equipment 
While the market for switching and transmission equipment 
may become more competitive through vertical disintegration, 
the competitive effects seems greatest in the market for 
terminal equipment. That competitive allocation seems possible, 
has been demonstrated in the USA by the recent Carter-Pho:: 
decision and subsequent Equipment Registration Programme, 
which allowed certified equipment to be connected directly to 
the network. The benefits of this programme are recognized 
and may be one reason for similar policy proposal in the U.K. 
(Peye, 1979) . 
In We.stern Europe some form of competition in the terminal 
equipment market has always been possible under the guidance 
of the PTT, in West Germany already since 1902 (Mestmacker, 
1980). The guidance and control of the PTT has at times been 
very restrictive, however. Only if this is reduced to some 
minimum standard are similar results to be expected, which we 
observed in the United States (Muller, 1979). The European 
Commission has recently taken up this challenge.*** B U ~  it
remains to be seen, under what conditions increased competition 
in that market is possible, and if the expected benefits are 
as large as we have observed them in the USA. 
Competition in the network also seems to be possible. The 
US has certainly moved in this direction, with its "above 890 
decision", the "open sky decision", the specialized common 
carrier decision, the "execunet decision", etc. * * * *  ~ l s o  in 
Canada, the traditional telegraph and data service of the 
railroads (CP/CN) has been allowed to interconnect with the 
national telephone network, therefore providing direct network 
competition. These policies have partially caught on in Europe, 
(i.e., Project Mercury in the UK) and the issue for increased 
competition is equally apparent. 
*See, the survey of the EEC's telematique plan in The European 
Community, December 1979, p.10. 
**See for details Muller, 1981. 
***See EEC, 1979. 
****See Miiller 1981. 
ECONOMIC ISSUES: THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN REGULATED 
MARKETS 
The above mentioned tendencies seem to indicate that 
different systems of organizational forms for the provision 
of telecommunication services are possible, from a move to a 
deregulated situation in the USA to the European approach, 
where all services Qn one hand is the norm. The question is, 
can we, as economists, say anything relevant on these issues? 
What recommendations would we be willing to make? 
At the outset, let me state four points: 
a. From my own background on the study of regulated 
industries, I have always found the introduction 
of competition beneficial as far as static and dynamic 
efficiency is concerned. (See Muller and Vogelsang, 
1979.) For this reason, I would tend to argue to 
allow as much competition as possible (see also the 
arguments in Muller and Vogelsang, 1978). 
b. Competition, even in regulated or public enterprise 
type environments, has helped to push dynamic perfor- 
mance and innovativeness. Not regulatory change, 
but the threat of entry and competition have helped 
to bring about the introduction of innovative services. 
What regulation or Government intervention has normally 
done, is to slow down such innovations and protect 
those benefitting from the status quo. (See Owen and 
Braeutigam, 1978, Posner, 1975). 
c. Increased competition helps to de-politicize public 
enterprise prices and leads to the quicker adaption 
of increased service variety. 
d. Increased reliance on cost-based or cost-related 
prices (which we normally expect as a result of 
increased competition) improve the allocative 
efficiency of markets. For this reason, we would 
also argue to let markets control allocations as much 
as possible. 
Normally, or at least according to text book economics, 
governments intervene in markets because of partial or total 
market failure. In the latter case, we have little chance for 
market control, (for example with the absence of property 
rights). But with partial market failure, some reliance on 
market forces may be possible, even in the case of economies 
of scale, externalities, etc. The uses of taxes or subsidies 
would be examples of such intervention. In the telephone 
industry, the granting of legal monopoly has often been used 
to avoid duplicative network structures. At the same time, 
tariffs have been controlled to avoid monopolistic profits. 
But as political economists, we often observe that government 
intervention is not only carried out to correct market failure, 
but also often to achieve other goals, mainly of the redis- 
tributive kinds. Equal charges for access, independent of cost, 
or public service type provisions are therefore the rule. 
Such uniformity of tariffs (or a rate-averaging) could 
also lead to entry in natural monopoly areas, where the threat 
of entry normally ought not to exist, except for the cases 
mentioned in the so-called 'sustainability literature', (Panzar 
and Willig, 1977 and Baumol, Bailey and Willig, 1977). It is 
mainly due to cross-subsidization (to achieve certain redistri- 
butive goals) that competitive entry is possible.* It does 
not necessarily take place because of the superior performance 
by the new entrant (either through improved productivity or 
new, innovative services of the product innovation type), but 
because of cream-skimming by the entrant. This would be 
socially inefficient, because if economies of scale are really 
so large that a natural monopoly is the result, wasteful dup- 
licative investment in infrastructure would take place. In 
addition, the surplus generating activity, which is needed to 
carry out the cross-subsidization is reduced as a result of 
competitive entry and the potential to cross-subsidize 
eliminated. 
Therefore, while competition in "idealized markets" (Willig, 
1979), may force firms to be efficient producers, the beneficial 
effect of competition for State Owned Enterprises, or other 
regulated firms, which pursue other goals in addition to the 
efficient allocation of resources, is less obvious. 
*I would argue that social, regional or administrative goals 
in pricing structures are a much more important reason for 
"non-sustainable" price structures than the arguments made in 
the original sustainability literature. 
We must therefore be very careful in interpreting the results 
from such competition. Successful entry may not necessarily 
be a sign of inefficiency, or the dwindling importance of 
economies of scale, but one of cross-subsidization. On the 
other hand, this point may also indicate that the current 
practice of prohibiting competition only to allow cross-sub- 
sidization may be a very inefficient policy of redistribution. 
First of all, it prevents the competitive threat, thereby 
increasing to bureaucratic inefficiency, etc. Second, the 
fact that cross-subsidization may be more efficiently carried 
out with separate taxes and subsidies ought to be kept in mind 
as well. 
With this background let us now look at the two kinds of 
competition which we have been talking about, competition in 
the network and competition for terminal equipment and analyze 
the empirical evidence available. 
NETWORK COMPETITION 
The telecommunications sector has, as mentioned previously, 
been normally characterized as a natural mo~opoly. Its network 
characteristic, especially with respect to the local network, 
seem to support this point. Estimates of economies of scale 
for telephone systems indicate scale elasticities in the 
neighborhood of 1.2 to 1.25.* On the basis of this, and under 
the assumption of no cross-subsidization, we would therefore 
not really expect the treat of efficient entry to materialize. 
But there are importnat counter arguments: 
a. First of all the economies of scale are different 
in each subpart of the system, thereby allowin for 
efficient entry in some markets to take place. St For 
example, the economies of scale for transmission 
services have been reduced with the introduction of 
wireless transmission systems, like microwave services 
and even more recently, direct broadcasting satellites 
(see also Waverman, 1975). 
*see Charles ~iver ~ssociates, 1979, p.193 for a summary of the 
relevant studies. 
**See also Ellis, 1975 for scale estimates in subparts of the 
system. 
Apparently, at least for point-to-point communication 
along direct routes, economies of scale are exhausted 
very early and duplicative services would not be 
inefficient. Of course, the technology is continuously 
changing, and one needs to analyze this question in 
detail.* At the moment, competition for inter-city 
services, transatlantic routes, etc., seems certainly 
possible, and economically efficient. The introduction 
of wireless communication techniques has strengthened 
this point. 
b. With local networks, and 80% of cable installation 
is with respect to local networks, the economies of 
scale seem still important, preserving there a natural 
monopoly. But even here, there are signs of technical 
change towards the potential of increased competition. 
One reason is the potential of a direct satellite link 
for large' customers at competitive rates. **  The 
other is a potential for radio links in the form of 
cellular systems. 
On the basis of these changed technological characteristics, 
one may conclude that competition in the network seems possible. 
The US seems to be moving in this direction, as is evident by 
the recent regulatory history (Muller and Vogelsang, 1979, 
Muller 1981) and the current legislative proposals to change 
the Communication Act of 1934. But if one moves in this 
direction some guidelines will have to be established, to ensure 
compatibility, reliability and the avoidance of duplicative 
investment. The threat of ruinous competition certainly looms 
large with the capital cost being such a high proportion of the 
service costs.*** 
*For a while, it looked as if wave-guided transmission lines 
would have such enormous economies of scale properties that 
the natural monopoly characteristic would be restored. But 
this development has now been surpassed by glass fibre tech- 
nology, whose implications are still open. 
**Largely because the prices for receiving antennae has decreased 
remarkably over the last few years from roughly $1000,000 (US) 
in 1975 to $999 today (Irwin, 1980, p.15). 
***But guidance may be drawn also'from the discussion about 
increased competition in the electricity industry (Weiss, 
1975). 
In Europe, except for the recent UK decision to allow one 
alternative network (project Mercury), there are few signs 
apparent of moves in this direction, despite the same tech- 
nological tendencies. We reserve our judgement on much a move 
for the moment. Nevertheless we should prepare such a decision 
with detailed background studies and an analysis 0 5  the US and 
the Canadian situation to determine to what extent such moves 
are politically and economically opportune. We do, however, 
recommend already now the possibility of shared use and resale 
of network services via so-called VAN (value-added networks).* 
A major casualty of such a system would be the cross-subsidiza- 
tion currently pursued under a uniform tariff structure.** 
Already, the deaveraging or unbundling of tariffs, as is 
apparent in the US, is being discussed as a real possibility. 
If one were not to go this way, but retain the competitive 
options then one would have to tax the potential entrant at 
a rate which is sufficient to offsettany surplus losses which 
would be needed for cross-subsidization.*** 
*See also Section 8. 
**Even now, tariff structures are not uniform as is apparent 
by the different population size of local exchange areas 
and the differenciated potential for calls it implies. 
***For details see Muller 1982, for a somewhat similar idea, 
see Willig, 1979, p.26. 
COMPETITION IN THE PROVISION OF TERMINAL EQUIPMENT 
Conceptually, the introduction of competition in the 
terminal equipment market is much more straightforward. There 
are no significant economies of scale, andjudging by the 
recent flood of entrants in the now liberated US market, 
barriers to entry seem to be relatively low. In West Germany, 
competition has already been practiced since 1902, since the 
Post Office and the equipment manufacturers both supply ter- 
minal equipment in competition with each other. This com- 
petition was said to be ruinous in the 1920s and 1930s and was 
then significantly restricted (Muller and Vogelsang, 1979, 
p.228). More recently, the experience in the US after the 
Carter one decision in 1968 is illuminating. The telephone 
companies (and their vertically integrated equipment companies) 
which had control over all terminal equipment and supplied 
nearly all of this, had now to compete with a newly established 
industry, the so-called "interconnect suppliers". Their share 
of the market is today 20 to 40%, mainly in the area of busi- 
ness application.* As a result, the innovative effect, and 
price/the performance/price ratio and the available product 
features have been significantly enhanced. 
This-policy-was achieved with the Federal-Comunications 
Commission narrowing the boundaries of the legal monopoly for 
the telephone companies. The alternative would have been to 
regulate the emerging computer sector as well, as a distinction 
between communication and data processing was becoming 
increasingly blurred. 
*For details, see Muller, 1981. 
The many new applications, which are possible with today's 
telecommunications technology, make it almost impossible to 
have all the terminal equipment items provided by the PTT. 
Otherwise restrictions in consumer freedom and the choice 
of applications may be frequently heard. With an increasing 
application potential in the future, especially with respect 
to electronic mail, office of the future, and the increased 
use of non-voice communication, the pressure for liberalization 
will build up further. But even if one is convinced, as I 
am, that the terminal equipment market may be cut out from the 
legal monopoly area and assigned to the market sector of the 
economy, some regulatory framework must remain in force. This 
basically deals with the issue of compatibility, avoidance of 
harm to the network, etc. a task we turn to next.* 
*Thus the possibility of "privatizing" some sectors, i.e., 
to move it to increased competitive allocation may reduce 
some elements in the vector of regulatory rules, but requiring 
the strengthening of others. The issues of standards is here 
an important one. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION IN THE TERMINAL EQUIPMENT MARKET 
The Telecommunications Systems as a Whole 
It has often been argued, especially in defense of the 
current legal monopoly set up, that the telecommunications 
system is made up of inseparable units, whose overall control 
has to be maintained in the hands of one central authority to 
ensure system integrity and service quality. This argument 
has been brought forward both by the privately regulated firms 
like AT & T and Bell Canada, and also by the European state- 
owned enterprises, like the BPO and the DBP.* Where competition 
in the terminal equipment market has been allowed to take 
place, it had to be under the rules of the responsible systems 
manager--the PTT. This traditional concept has recently 
become increasingly difficult to'apply, however, given the 
emergence of new terminal devices. In addition, the PTT's 
have not always been fair in their rule as an arbitrator and 
judge of the competitive rules. 
These arguments of technical inter-dependence are, of 
course, no reason to withdraw one sector from competitive 
allocation as such interdependence is also apparent in other 
economic activities. But it must be kept in mind, that to 
organize such a system efficiently an optimization in parts 
must lead to optimization of the system as a whole. 
Regulatory rules designed to enhance competition ought 
to keep that in mind. 
*See Muller and Vogelsang, 1979, 225 for details. 
Problems in Separating the Terminal Side from the Network 
The major problems which make a unique separation so 
difficult rest on what we have called the "Federal Structure" 
of the telecommunication system is the same. In such a system, 
the customers have equally intensive communication patterns 
between each other. Separation between network and terminal 
parts is therefore fairly simple: the network would be seen 
as a sum of those parts of the system which are necessary for 
the transmission of signals between receiver and sender. The 
terminal side are all those parts necessary for coding at the 
senders' end and decoding at the recievers' end. We assume 
that this kind of definition could be maintained even in the 
face of continuing technical changes. Of course, the issue of 
compatability would always need to be kept in mind.* 
Against this non-federalist model, reality is, of course, 
much more complicated. There, we find geogqaphically unequally 
distributed participants, and, what seems much more important, 
different intensities of communication needs between partici- 
pants. If we group these participants according to their 
main communicative interaction (basically like identifying 
a center of gravity) then we can identify, in effect, different 
sub-groups which have a different internal communication need. 
The larger the need for intra-group communications, and the 
more task specific and repetitive such communication needs are, 
the greater the tendency for a group to optimize its own 
communication needs. Therefore both the hardware and the 
software would be designed differently from that of the general 
public service system. This can either lead to the require- 
ment for special types of terminal equipment, or even to 
specialized telephone networks, if the intra-group interaction 
is between geographically dispersed participants. Examples of 
such specialized terminal equipment are computer terminals in 
various forms like alarm signals, cash dispensers, point of 
sales, etc. Examples of specialized networks are that of the 
airlines, (SITA) - or the networks of the banks (SWIFT) . In 
such a system, the boundaries between network and the terminal 
side are now much more difficult to draw. For example, a 
PABX** would now be defined as part of the network, even 
though at the moment it is provided competitively in a number 
of national markets. On the other hand, specialized "closed 
networks" are even in Europe allowed to be set up on the basis 
of existing public networks. 
*For example, for each part of the system, no matter how 
peripheral it is, the question of compatability is foremost, 
strengthening the argument, that some regulatory agency, not 
the PTT should ensure such systems compatability. In any case, 
given these externalities, it is possible that even terminal 
equipment may have a network characteristic. 
**Private automatic branch exchange. 
The network becomes then only an information carrying device, 
no longer an open service (like Telex, for example). It 
is therefore important to note that, with a federal communica- 
tion structure, a separation of the terminal equipment and 
network side is much more difficult, especially with an , '  
operating definition, which survives technical change and 
changing economic conditions. One may at times have to 
reinterpret these boundary lines. 
At the same time the increased need for more specialized 
networks seems to indicate a special demand in addition to the 
public network concept. Here the economies of scale in network 
provision have to be weighed against the benefits accruing 
through specialization of sub-systems within a federal struc- 
ture. 
Criteria for Terminal Equipment Licensing 
In spite of these difficulties, I would pragmatically 
argue for a set of regulatory rules which liberalize the 
licensing and use of terminal equipment as much as possible. 
As mentioned above, the technical advances in the telecommuni- 
cations sector have been very substantial. The ability to 
translate them into productivity changes and a rising standard 
of living are important factors for the competitiveness of an 
economy. By allowing, to quote Hayek, 1945, the use of the 
competitive allocation process as a discovery procedure in 
the search for new applications of technology, the benefit 
of these new services may be extracted earlier as with an 
administrative system. This argues for increased liberaliza- 
tion of terminal equipment use, and, as we shall see later On, 
for network utilization as well. 
With respect to the actual licensing criteria, there 
are a number of options possible. On one end of the spectrum 
lies the US criteria exemplified by the recent Equipment 
Registration Programme. It looks only at what has been called 
First and Third Party Harm. First Party Harm refers to safety 
consideration for the user, and Third Party Harm to safety 
consideration of network employees. Any equipment which does 
not cause First and Third Party Harm may be licensed. 
Second Party Harm is not an argument against licensing in the 
US. By Second Party Harm we mean that the quality of trans- 
mission, because of poor terminal equipment is so bad, that the 
cornpatability is no longer insured. The Americans argue that 
this ought nevertheless be left to the market.* 
*Some may even argue for the issue of First and Third Party 
Harm be left to the market as well. To settle this point, 
one ought to keep the relative high transaction cost of 
such a solution in mind. 
This has enabled them to have a relatively simple licensing 
procedure. With only six or seven employees, they licence 
approximately 5-600 applications per year.* Turnaround time 
is below two months, compared to the much more lengthy 
certification process in Western Europe. 
On the other extreme is the policy which is carried out 
in those countries in Europe where already some competition 
in terminal equipment is permitted. In essence, the PTT 
sets the rules and usually, in addition to requiring safety, 
(First and Third Party Harm) and compatability (Second Party 
Harm), also specifies additional product features. Quality 
competition, with respect to additional features or quality 
variations, is therefore extremely limited.** 
My position is somewhere in the middle. I would require, 
in addition to the basic concept of the registration programme, 
the possibility to mandate compatability of the FCC, the 
avoidance of First and Third Party Harm. The basic argument 
is one of externality or Second Party benefit. This would 
at least require the establishment of some minimum quality 
characteristics.*** The other point is that sometimes a 
changeover to new technologies may require modifications, 
both in the network and the terminal equipment.**** By no 
longer licensing the out-dated equipment, the changeover to 
a new standard can be carried out faster'. 
I would, however, argue strongly against the specification 
of extra product characteristics, for example for reasons of 
system uniformity or the argument made by the Swiss that the 
interchange of telephone operators is facilitated by uniform 
product features. Some may argue that otherwise this would 
lead to increased product proliferation, perhaps even waste- 
ful R & D, especially as compared with the traditional PTT 
approach, which emphasized standardized terminal products. I 
believe the market could settle this issue quite well, especially 
as some of the products mature. 
*See Muller, 1981, for details. 
**Some European PTTs provide all terminal equipment directly 
to the customer. Competition therefore only takes place 
via the procurement policy of the PTT, which is often limited 
to a few national suppliers only. 
***It is interesting to note that the Americans are quietly 
thinking about this aspect as well. But this will probably 
not result in a change in the FCC rules, but only in an 
attempt to self regulate a minimum standard by the Electronic 
Industry Association. 
****For example a move from a three minute to a one-minute 
facsimile terminal. 
In any case, the PTT is free to offer a range of standaridized 
products itself, which would help the customer to orient 
himself. Specialized needs of more innovative customers 
could nevertheless be fulfilled without any extre bureaucratic 
procudure. 
Such a licensing policy would not take into account some 
other arguments which are currently popular with European 
PTT authorities, such as trade policy, employment policy 
or industry policy, and competition policy to mention only a 
few.* 
What Role Should the PTT Play in such a "Liberalized" Terminal 
Equipment Market? 
This is an argument which has aroused a particularly 
vehement discussion in West Germany. I will therefore just 
summarize the points made for and against the participation 
of the DBP. The same arguments apply probably equally well 
to the other West European PTTs. The arguments against 
participation: 
-- the arguments for competition in a mixed economy 
require that a PTT as a state organization does not 
engage in a competitive sector, where services may 
be provided by the free market;** 
-- network operators have a comparative advantage vis- 
a-vis new entrants into the terminal equipment market 
which gives them a competition advantage and leads to 
unequal competition; 
-- the PTT may use its revenues from other activities 
to carry out predatory pricing; and 
-- the PTT cannot be an objective judge for licensing 
criteria in the terminal equipment market if it 
participates in it at the same time. 
The arguments for participation: 
-- the PTT has an infra-structure responsibility; 
*For example, in West Germany and also in the UK the very 
advanced PABX by IBM 2750 (and later 3750) was initially not 
licensed, because the competitors were afraid to lose market 
shares. In cooperation with the PTT, they held off long 
enough until they were able to innovate themselves. 
**In Germany this is justified on the basis bf the "Sub- 
sidaritatsprinzip". 
-- many customers have the desire to have network 
services and terminal equipment from one agency, 
simplifying dealings regarding service and maintenance 
problems. This possibility should be maintained; 
-- the PTT requires experience from the terminal equip- 
ment market for its network policy ("window function"); 
-- the PTT as a state owned enterprise can increase com- 
petition in oligopolistic terminal equipment markets; 
and 
-- the PTT must provide terminal equipment for such . 
services which are not being provided by private 
suppliers. 
These arguments center around three points: Economies 
of scope, predatory pricing and conflicting interest. By 
economies of scope, we mean the benefits which exist by 
supplying more than one service through the same firm (see 
also Panzar, Willig, 1975). If economies of scope exist for 
network operators with respect to the distribution and ser- 
vicing of terminal equipment, then the PTT ought to be 
allowed to exploit these benefits. Some of the arguments 
mentioned above go in this direction, and we would therefore 
accept them. But since it is not clear in which markets 
economies of scope are important, one should leave it up to 
the market to discover the extent of these benefits. 
On the other hand, economies of scope may also play a 
role in the PTT as a licensing body for the terminal equip- 
ment. In this case, however, we have to weigh these benefits 
against the potential for abuse of this position because of 
conflict of interest.* It seems quite clear from the way 
the Americans have carried out their registration program, 
that economies of scope are not very important. The licensing 
function can easily be delegated to a separate independent 
authority, to avoid the confTict of interest problem. 
An important issue which has come up in this debate, 
and which has not satisfactorily been resolved, is the issue 
of predatory pricing, which is, of course, another form of 
cross-subsidization. Especially if a commoncarrier is active 
in other markets, in which economies of scale are large, and 
the threat of entry is low, a subsidization of entry threatened 
activities may prevent such entrance from taking place. The 
US proposals ahve included the setting up of separate indepe- 
dent arms-length subsidiaries and the requirement for refined 
accounting methods to better control the potential for pre- 
datory pricing. 
*The PTT cannot really be a player in the market and a referee 
at the same time. 
However, even though e x i s t i n g  account ing methods could be  
g r e a t l y  improved (see MKW f o r  d e t a i l s )  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  
economies o f  scope could  r e a l l y  make t h e  s e t t i n g  up of  arm- 
l e n g t h  s u b s i d i a r i e s  an economically i n e f f i c i e n t  e x e r c i s e .  
The i s s u e  of  p reda to ry  p r i c i n g  i s  complicated by t h e  
complementary r e l a t i o n s h i p  between network and t e r m i n a l  
equipment. I n  Germany, t h e  Pos t  O f f i c e  was accused o f  pre-  
d a t o r y  p r i c i n g  r ega rd ing  i t s  r e c e n t  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  "Telefax"  
( f a c s i m i l e  s e r v i c e s )  because it used unusua l ly  s h o r t  t e r m  
leases. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  PTT as a network o p e r a t i o n  
must be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s e c u r i n g  t h e  qu ick  growth o f  new s e r v i c e s ,  
whose appea l  i n c r e a s e s  w i th  a l a r g e r  network of  customers.  
By adap t ing  such a p o l i c y  of  s h o r t  t e r m  l e a s e s ,  it encouraged 
t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of  some. customers t o  experiment w i t h  new 
s e r v i c e s . *  
A s  a b a s i s  of t h e  above d i s c u s s i o n ,  w e  would t h e r e f o r e  
a rgue  f o r  a p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  t h e  PTT i n  t h e  t e r m i n a l  equip- 
ment market.  There are t h r e e  important  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t o  be 
borne i n  mind, however. F i r s t  o f  a l l  t h e  danger of  p reda to ry  
p r i c i n g  has  t o  be checked v i a  a more c o s t - o r i e n t e d  account ing  
method. Secondly,  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  f u n c t i o n  h a s  t o  be  kep t  
s e p a r a t e  from t h e  PTT. Th i rd ly ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of t h e  a n t i -  
t r u s t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  should be  extended t o  cover  t h e  PTT 
a c t i v i t i e s  as w e l l .  I n  t h e  case of  Germany, t h i s  would mean 
an ex t ens ion  of  t h e  abuse of  dominant market  power l a w  (para-  
graph 22  GWB) t o  such a c t i v i t i e s .  
*The o t h e r  problem which seems much more s e r i o u s  i s  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  of  t h e  PTT t o  a t t r i b u t e  i t s  c o s t s  adequa te ly  t o  
each s e r v i c e .  For t h i s  reason  a lone ,  t h e  problem of even 
u n i n t e n t i o n a l  p reda to ry  p r i c i n g  remains.  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  
a l s o  much more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  market t o  determine t h e  
economies of  scope advantages  a PTT i n h e r e n t l y  has .  
A PROPOSAL FOR UNRESTRICTED NETWORK USE 
We have a l r eady  argued f o r  a  pol icy  t o  ensure a  maximum 
amount of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  both i n  t h e  use of te rminal  equip- 
ment and t h e  e x i s t i n g  networks. This should a l s o  inc lude  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e s a l e  t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  eventua l ly  leading  
t o  Value Added Networks. Such a pol icy  would c e r t a i n l y  allow 
t h e  network t o  be used more r a t i o n a l l y  and would al low inno- 
v a t i v e  ent repreneurs  t o  discover  new u t i l i z a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  
f o r  t h e  telecommunications network. 
The drawback of such a  r e s a l e  pol icy  with r e s p e c t  t o  
network use i s  t h e  danger of cream-skimming. Value added 
networks o r  o t h e r  en t repreneurs  w i l l  tend t o  r e - s e l l  a  given 
network capaci ty  t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  when t a r i f f s  a r e  not  pro- 
p o r t i o n a l  t o  c o s t .  I f  t h e  t a r i f f s  a r e  cos t -or iented ,  then  
t h i r d  p a r t i e s  w i l l  only f i n d  it b e n e f i c i a l  t o  r e - s e l l  e x i s t i n g  
ne tworkserv ices  i f  they a r e  more e f f i c i e n t  i n  t h a t  than t h e  
e x i s t i n g  PTT o r  provide a d d i t i o n a l  value i n  the  form of d a t a  
processing,  message s t o r i n g  and forwarding o r  packet switching, 
f o r  example. Both tendencies  a r e  then d e s i r a b l e .  
Nevertheless ,  some governments may s t i l l  i n s i s t  on a  
un i t a ry  t a r i f f  po l i cy  i n  order  t o  encourage cross-subs id iza t ion  
t o  l e s s  densely populated regions.  I n  t h i s  case ,  a  t a x  would 
have t o  be l ev ied  on such t h i r d  p a r t  s a l e s  which would be 
equiva lent  t o  t h e  amount of cross-subsidizing revenue l o s t .  
Only i f  a  t h i r d  pa r ty  r e t a i l e r  was more e f f i c i e n t ,  o r  c rea ted  
some value added ( f o r  which h i s  own c o s t s  were below revenues) 
would he be a b l e  t o  e n t e r .  
Unres t r ic ted  network use would t h e r e f o r e  lead  d i r e c t l y  
t o  a  cos t -or iented  t a r i f f  s t r u c t u r e .  This  argument i s  the re -  
fore also made on-the basis of giving the price signal a 
more inportant function in the telecommunications sector. 
Often we observe co-existing networks next to each other 
(for example data and telex networks) which may serve similar 
functions, but are priced differently for policy reasons. 
There is no technical reason why such differentiation takes 
place. A policy of more liberal network use and a more cost- 
oriented tariff would take innovative developments directly 
to consumers, and allow them, if necessary, to optimize their 
system f m m  their point of view. In addition, such a move 
would as we have mentioned above, depoliticize tariffs, at 
least between different services. 
The question left open is to what extent such competition 
will put enough pressure on the PTT to also behave more 
efficiently in its network configuration, (i.e., without 
proposing already now network competition). If PTT's engage 
in gold-plating, then, at least at the moment, we do not 
really see the competitive pressure of value added networks 
with respect to the network configuration of the PTT. This 
will only be possible if one allows either genuine network 
competition, or at least intermodal competition between 
terestrial and staellite services, for example via the use 
of international satellite. If this option is not feasible, 
regulatory pressure on the PTT must remain high to provide 
for efficient network configuration. 
CONSEQUENCES OF A LIBERAL TERMINAL EQUIPMENT AND NETWORK 
UTILIZATION POLICY 
If the terminal equipment policy, which we recommend, 
is implemented, then a much wider range of terminal equipment 
products will be available as compared to now. This will not 
only increase the available product spectrum to customers in 
the short run, but also increase competition and innovation 
in the long run. One can certainly conclude this from the 
policy in the United States, even though the market before 
the Carter one decision had a much less competitive structure 
as compared to the European one. The economic lifetime of 
the equipment will probably decrease and reflect technical 
change much more than ikt the moment. I do not believe that 
such policies would lead to equipment proliferation as has 
sometimes been argued. But even with the implementation of 
such a proposal, I believe that the PTT will continue to play 
a strong role in the terminal equipment market, especially 
with respect to household customers. Business users will 
probably be more easily competed away by direct suppliers, 
as they have more specialized needs. At the moment, in the 
U.S.A., the terminal equipment market, which used to be 100% 
common carriers is today 40% controlled by so-called "inter- 
connect suppliers". (See Miiller , 1 98 1 . ) 
Regarding network utilization, a resale and shared use 
provision will result in a more effective utilization of the 
network. The existence of value added networks should help 
the PTTs to bring their tariff policy more in line with 
existing costs. A more innovative utilization could be the 
direct result of such a policy, even if the PTT by itself 
does not move in this direction. The VAN may lead such 
developments. In addition, if individual firms are allowed 
to both use terminal equipment and networks according to their 
own discretion, many more innovative potentials will be 
realized than are currently possible with the very slow 
bureaucratic opening-up of new services by the PTT. This 
will not always lead to a universal service structure, but 
with the emergence and need for more specialized networks, 
such a policy ought to be encouraged.* 
*Already now, the PTT's are having a difficult time policing 
the activities on certain leased lines. 
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DEBITS AND CREDITS IN TELeCOMM UNICATIONS* 
Joseph Puzman 
Czechoslovak Federa l  Ministry of Technology 
1. Introduction 
Under the term "telecommunications'' we uriderstand all means of 
remote information transfer between two subjects (man-man, man- 
machine, machine-macbne) or among groups of subjects (machine- 
people, man-people, machine-machmes, and all combinations thereof). 
We emphasize the necessary adjective "remote" because direct communi- 
cation and local communication, which are governed by other rules, are 
beyond the scope of this paper. We shall not touch upon the notion of 
information and its value, in spite of the fact that these play an important 
role in telecommunications, particularly in benefit analysis (see Braun 
1982). We shall adhere to the vague definition of telecommunications as 
all information that is transferred by means of electrical signals, regard- 
less whether it is helpful to the user or only confuses him. 
For the most part, because of their wide political, economic, and 
social impact on the government, industry, defense, business, and life in 
general, the telecommunication systems and networks are owned by the 
P'ITs, which are governmental (rarely private) branches. For the sake of 
clarity, the telecommunication system owner will be called a vendor 
throughout the paper. By this is meant a PTT, a recognized private 
operating agency (RPOA), or other responsible for telecommunication 
networks installation and maintenance. 
From the point of view of the vendor all users are subscribers. At 
present, however, subscribers do not utilize telecommunication systems 
for passive information transfer alone; they also take advantage of some 
information services and resources and become information consumers. 
We will adhere to the general term user. The third subject, the manufac- 
turer (supplier) of innovative facilities, oscillates between the vendor and 
the user. 
The aim of the paper is to elaborate on ideas and issues formulated 
concisely and exhaustively by Vasko (1982), particularly on his section 
concerned with selection environment and relations to other sectors with 
respect to the efficiency. 
2. The Benefits  of Telecommunicat ions  
Telecommunications, whose origin dates to the last century (with the 
invention of telegraph and telephone sets as well as the first radio 
transmission), very soon became the largest technological system. The 
worldwide telephone and telex networks, the national broadcasting and 
*I would like to express my gratitude to Tibor Vasko for his encouragement, useful sugges 
tions, and advice. I a m  also grateful to  IIASA for making possible the visit to  the Institute 
during which I wrote this paper. 
television systems, and the regional radio mobile systems have all been 
accepted as inseparable from governmental, industrial, business, and 
human life . 
In spite of the fact that telecommunications is a capital-intensive 
branch with substantial operating costs, in the past it has been expressed 
in vague political and sociological terms. This is not surprising in cases 
where the main expenditures are supported by the government (the P?T 
as a vendor is state-operated in most countries), which rarely (or never) 
has asked for revenues. 
The situation has changed recently due to limitations on resources, 
i.e., energy. Now each innovation in telecommunication, each introduc- 
tion of a new service, each improvement in telecommunications perfor- 
mance, is being accompanied by the very simple question: "How much 
w i l l  it cos t  and what p ~ o f i t s  w i l l  if bTi7Lg?11 While the question is simple, 
the answer would be practically unobtainable if we were to rely on tradi- 
tional approaches to calculating benefit. 
The man with a telephone on his table rarely calculates how it saves 
his time and/or money if he used it instead of physically going to the 
party with whom he wished to communicate. Nor does the family with a 
TV set save money in the family budget by watching a TV performance 
rather than going to the theater. These and many other examples show 
that information transfer can replace mass transport. This idea is not 
new (see, e.g., Day 1978; regarding data communications, this is dealt 
with in detail by Maurer e t  al. 1982). Thus the benefit of every telecom- 
munication system or network can be calculated in terms of energy con- 
servation. 
Although telecommunications has been conservative in its evolution 
due to barriers tied with international standardization (needed to facili- 
tate collaboration between countries), from time to time it needs to be 
innovated. While the innovation cycle in the telecommunications industry 
is five years or less, the rate of return for telecommunications equipment 
is placed a t  20 years and the real lifetime is known to be twice or three 
times this (for example, for cables and exchanges). Nevertheless, 
manufacturers are eager to sell their up-to-date (and more expensive) 
telecommunications equipment, so they try to prove the necessity to 
implement it into existing networks. 
It has been claimed that the forthcoming telecommunications facili- 
ties will be less energy demanding than the present ones (see, for exam- 
ple, Maurer e t  al. 1982). This is true as far as transmission equipment is 
concerned, but the electrical energy saved is too negligible to be used to 
support an argument. It may be true of broadcasting (to a greater 
extent) and TV transmitters (to a lesser extent), but in the sum, the sav- 
ings are not very significant. It is completely false, however, if we con- 
sider one of the most scattered and therefore energy-cbnsuming telecom- 
munications facilities: the exchange. While by using earlier types of 
exchanges based on relays or the crossbar, one can conserve much elec- 
tricity during operation time, the modern switching systems (semielec- 
tronic and electronic) are on the average hghly electricity-consuming. 
But they smooth out the consumption peaks, and this represents pro- 
gress, since such exchanges economize energy during peak hours, 
allowing it to be saved up at  power plants. 
There are, however, other reasons why innovation is needed in 
telecommunications. Besides space, and therefore building capacity and 
manpower savings, innovation makes possible new services with higher 
performance, which in turn are transformable into energy saving. 
Consider such services as data communication, cable television 
( A  teletex, teletext, videotex (viewdata), videotext, bureaufax, 
telefax (remote printing), teleconferencing, and videoconferencing, each 
of which represents an almost identical service, although they are called 
differently from one country to the next. Although most of them are in 
commercial operation and are already tied with CCITT recommendations 
we cannot be sure whether all will survive, or whether they will share the 
fate of the short-lived American videotelephone (Picturephone). Careful 
calculations and assessment, however, presage their mass development, 
particularly in view of their potential for saving energy (Kraemer 1982). 
New techniques and technologies are already greatly affecting 
telecommunication performance. Since telecommunications has many 
dimensions, its quality is expressed in terms of the values of performance 
parameters used to evaluate user demand criteria rather than by some 
figure of merit. Table 1 shows the criteria and some of their parameters. 
Table 1. Telecommunications performance 
Performance criterion 
capacity 
readiness 
fidelity, accuracy 
reliability 
source /sink layout 
Performance parameters 
bandwidth, transmission rate, throughput 
access time, delay 
intelligibility, S / N  ratio, error rate 
MTBF, MTTR, availability 
distance, transmission power, receiving sensitivity 
A typical parameter that tends to improve is transmission rate and 
bit error rate. Through new technology the transmission capacity has 
increased from several bits per second in the last century to several hun- 
dred megabits per second today, resulting in a corresponding increase in 
transmission rate. And only within the last 15 years, new technology has 
decreased the bit error rate of data communication services by the same 
order. (see Table 2). 
-51- 
Table 2. The trend toward higher accuracy as reflected in bit error rates. 
There are, however, certain weaknesses inherent in new telecom- 
munications technology. The satellite technique causes greater and 
moreover fluctuating transmission delays than with common wire and 
radio (240-270 milliseconds depending on the layout of the terrestrial sta- 
tions in relation to the geostationary satellite), which, on the other hand, 
enables the sending station to "hear itself". The store-and-forward tech- 
nique prevents users from conversing (in man-machine dialogue) and the 
users are subject to a lack of audience (in teleconferencing). Finally, 
modern technology must combat information misapplication and wilful 
annihilation, problems that have arisen because modern telecommunica- 
tions techniques do not afford the privacy of mail and tete-a-tete conver- 
sation. 
As an example, let us show how modern technology worsens the call 
set-up time in circuit-switched networks. Table 3 shows the typical values 
of call set-up times for four generations of switching technologies for con- 
nections within an exchange and connections via three exchanges. In 
defiance of very high speed LSI and VLST technology, electronic switching 
systems call for decentralized control and for control data exchange 
between stations when setting up a call by means of several exchanges 
and this consumes quite a lot of time. 
Type of Service 
Switched telegraph and telephone lines 
Leased telegraph and telephone lines 
Message-switched network 
Public line-switched network 
Packet-switched network 
Public packet-switched network 
Table 3. Set-up times of switchng systems in circuit-switched networks. 
BER (bit error rate) 
lob4 
1 o - ~  
1 o - ~  
1 o - ~  
10-l2 
1 0-l5 
But regardless of the pros and cons of implementing new technology 
into telecommunication systems and networks, we may conclude that 
innovation in telecommunications affords beneflts that are quantifiable in 
terms of energy, time, and cost savings. 
Switching system 
Step-by-step (1st generation) 
Crossbar (2nd generation) 
Semi-electronic and electronic 
(3rd and 4th generations) 
Set-up time (in milliseconds) 
within 1 
exchange 
220 
1700 
80 
via 3 
exchanges 
220 
2300 
700 
Now we turn our attention to another side of coin: expenditures 
3. The Costs of Telecommunications 
Although all telecommunication networks (telex, telephone, broad- 
casting, TV) are large and sophisticated, the charges for their services 
are disproportionately low everywhere. For example, a telephone call 
between two users involves the complexity of setting up the connection 
and the high requirements for voice transmission capability, which must 
sometimes smooth out traffic peaks and compete with noise and other 
disturbances. And yet the charges for such a call can generally be quoted 
in mere fractions of the local currency. The user's budget is scarcely 
burdened by telecommunication expenses. 
The vendor, however, must invest in the telecommunication equip- 
ment, maintain it and innovate it. Both capital expenditures and operat- 
ing costs are enormous and these can hardly be returned in a short time. 
This explains the long rates of return in telecommunications. Moreover, 
the price of innovative equipment continues to rise regardless of its abil- 
ity to benefit the vendor directly (as in absolute manpower saving). 
The vendor has in fact a tool for improving his position: tariffs. Upon 
introducing a new service he sets the tariff, which should pay for his 
expenditures as soon as possible, at an appropriate level. However, if the 
tariffs are too high they will cause the user to utilize the new service less 
or prevent him from utilizing it a t  all. For example, greatly increasing 
the installation charges for telephone subscriber lines will result in a 
decrease in the number of potential users. 
There is, however, another solution. By introducing new telecom- 
munications systems not based strictly on vendor's facilities (the data 
transmission and computer networks have been such cases) and requir- 
ing the user to purchase and maintain a part of the communications 
equipment, the vendor shifts some capital and operating costs to the 
user. The installation and operation of the user facility, which is closely 
connected to the vendor's property, is supervised and controlled by the 
vendor. In Czechoslovakia a t  present all telegraph devices and PABXs are 
purchased by users. However, they become the property of the PTT, 
which must maintain them. This policy decreases the capital expendi- 
tures of the vendor. 
We very often meet with this type of situation with respect to new 
telecommunications services. In computer networks the whole environ- 
ment demarcated by DTEs (terminals, HOSTS, FEPs, communication con- 
trollers) belongs to the user; the same is true of videotex, teletex, CATV, 
etc. 
We have mentioned CAW (cable television), which is very costly. Let 
us point out its negative impact on the user's budget. Suppose CATV does 
not replace direct TV reception, but only enables good reception in "hid- 
den" areas (those covered insufficiently by TV s~gnals). As CATV must be 
installed and maintained by the user, inhabitants then fall into two 
groups: those who have good reception and need only pay for a cheap 
antenna, and those who have to pay several times more for the CATV. 
Finally, it should be noted that new services also charge users 
according to transport and travel expenses (this expanding cost is 
surprisingly hlgh due to the need to set up terminal equipment at remote 
locations) and by learning expenses (the user must become skilled in 
handling the new terminal equipment, and he must become familiar with 
the types of services it offers and get accustomed to its features). 
Now let us turn our attention to telecommunications tariffs. If we 
examine the national tariffs currently in effect in Europe, we can see very 
great differences, even between neighboring countries. Both the level of 
tariffs and their structure vary widely from one country to the next. As 
an example let us take the monthly rental charges for inland leased tele- 
phone lines as a function of distance (see EURODATA 1981). Figure 1 
shows several typical functions: purely linear, linear with a point of 
saturation, piecewise linear, and stepwise. We most often encounter the 
stepwise rate outlined in figure 1. A closer analysis shows that the 
number of steps ranges from three in tiny Luxembourg, where only three 
rate zones (within the same telephone exchange, between exchanges 
within a sector, and otherwise) are distinguished up to 15-17 in the North- 
ern European countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden). Some linear func- 
tions in fact approximate the stepwise form having uniform steps of one 
hundred meters or one kilometer, or irregular steps as in the United 
Kingdom. Note that beyond a certain distance, rental charges in Belgium, 
France, Ireland, and the UK become distance independent while in other 
countries they remain distance-dependent throughout the range of the 
country. For stepwise dependency, however, the saturation level is 
always determined. 
Although different countries have different tariffs the performance of 
services is nearly the same due to international standardization (CCIIT 
recommendations). 
Similar differences can be found in international charges. Thus it is 
not surprising that companies have begun to shop around for the best 
locations to set up centers for their computer networks. For example, 
IBM chose the UK for its Response Time Sharing Service (Lloyd and Peltu 
1 ~ 8 1 ) .  The charges for accessing the US packet-switched networks of 
Tymnet and Telenet for Europe vary by a factor of 40 depending on whch 
vendor (PIT) hosts the user terminal (Sebestyen 1980). 
Such discrepancies should be eliminated and a uniform tariff policy 
should be agreed upon. 
4. The Cost-Benefit Balance 
When expressing the economic efficiency of any device or system, 
regardless of what formula is used the values of benefits and costs must 
be known. Generally speaking, the efficiency is the relation between 
attained useful benefit and consumption of social work and is most often 
expressed in financial terms (see Table 4). Note that in Table 4 operating 
expenditures are not explicitly expressed in C and are hidden in B. (Each 
benefit must be diminished by operating costs.) However, this does not 
change the essence of the matter. Without exact calculations of the 
m o u n t  of benefits and cost, no economic efficiency measurement can be 
specified, despite the fact that the formulae in Table 4 seem to be very 
Monthly Rent 
Belgium 
Austria, FRG, Iceland, 
France, Ireland, UK 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Luxembourg, IVetherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
b 
Distance 
Figure 1. Types of monthly rental tariffs with dependencies upon line dis- 
tance. 
simple. (Of course they do not respect the time value of money.) There 
remains the question of how to achieve an appropriate income, because 
the optimization problem is, in general, insolvable. 
Table 4. Measurements of economic efficiency. 
Total benefits 
Total capital costs 
Lifetime 
Total efficiency rate 
Efficiency total rate 
Time of refund 
Return of investment 
Costs/benefits balance 
B  
C  
T  
E  = B / C  
B -  C  
T / E  
E / T  
C / B  = 1 / E  
First of all, let us look a t  the relationship vendor-user- 
manufacturer. Or~ginally, there was a strong link only between vendor 
and manufacturer, who influenced each other while the user was a passive 
consumer of telecommunications services (see Part a) of Figure 2). While 
this alliance still remains, the user is moving closer to the vendor and at  
the same time is building up a relationship with the manufacturer, whom 
he looks to supply and maintain a part of the telecommunications system 
(Figure 2, Part b). Thus a triangle or "three-sided coin" has arisen, in 
which each partner seeks to be as efficient as possible. 
Vendor r  Vendor 
Manu- L 
facturer User 
3 L 
b 
Figure 2. The relationshp vendor-manufacturer-user. 
a) previous b) present 
The behavior of the manufacturer is governed by common economic 
laws, just as in other branches. However, the telecommunication 
manufacturer is not only bound by certain constraints such as those 
imposed by the national standardization body, but also by restrictions 
which may be more robust than in other branches. The supply need not 
be accepted due to unsatisfied technical demands from the vendor side 
regardless of a discount and may not be marketable at  all due to the 
vendor's monopoly. Thus we should pay particular attention to the rela- 
tionship between vendor and user. 
The two subjects stem from the telecommunications system perfor- 
mance (which we denote P bearing in mind that it is a multicomponent 
vector of performance parameters), which indicates user benefit, and the 
telecommunications costs (C) expressed for our case both in the capital 
and operating expenditures of the vendor and in charges to the user for 
services. The charges, based on the vendor's tariff policy, should balance 
the vendor's expenditures. 
When a vendor invests money to install a technology, he seeks to pro- 
vide the best services with the hghest performance values. The user, on 
the other hand, wants to meet his demands a t  minimal costs. So we can 
write: 
from the vendor side : 
max P for C being constant or limited by some C* 
from the user side : 
min C for P being constant or limited by some P* 
where max and min are taken over all services afforded. 
Let us show this using a simple example. The user wishes to connect 
a keyboard terminal to a computer. The lowest sufficient transmission 
rate is 200 bits/s. The vendor provides two types of services: either he 
will lease telegraph lines at  lower charges or he will lease telephone lines 
at  higher charges. The user, who has access to all the necessary data, 
decides which type of service would be more convenient for him. 
Although the telephone line allows a higher transmission rate (up to 10 
kbits/s) the user opts for the telegraph line in order to minimize costs. 
Once he has established a telephone line, the vendor has an interest 
in leasing it. If the line is too expensive for a single user, he can equip it 
with an exchange or a multiplexor (MUX) and offer it to several users at a 
suitable charge in order to induce users to prefer it to the telegraph ser- 
vice. 
These efforts are closely connected with vendor tariff policy assess- 
ment. Ths is not just a question of absolute charge figures but rather of 
their dependency upon performance parameters. 
Charges for lines depend primarily upon transmission rate or 
bandwidth. For example, leasing charges for telegraph circuits and tele- 
phone lines increase with increasing transmission rate, regardless of 
whether the cost of the data sets, whch are owned by the user, also 
increases. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us imagine a linear dependency (see 
Figure 3). The vendor leases the line with a certain range of transmission 
rates R. The charge C may be either transmission-rate independent or 
linearly dependent. Two parameters influence the behavior of users and 
vendors: c, and k. 
If k = 0 and c, > 0, this is advantageous for the user because he need 
not take care of the efficiency, but it is inconvenient for the vendor as he 
must invest much money establishing and maintaining the line up to the 
u h e s t  transmission rate. However, he is able to ease hls expenses by an 
appropriate choice of c,. If c, is high the user tends toward hlgher utili- 
zation of transmission capacity since the relative costs for, let us say, 
each kbit transferred is cut down. 
If k > 0 and c, = 0, t h s  is ideal for the vendor if k is appropriately 
chosen (say k = 1). On the other hand, however, the user would prefer to 
lease more lines when he needs more capacity (for example, a doubled 
rate would lead to the leasing of two lines, which would take up a large 
part of the telecommunications network capacity). 
Figure 3. Line charges with dependencies upon transmission rates. 
So there must be a compromise. In the simplest case, this acquires 
the form 
C=A.R+B 
where A and B are positive constants. 
If we look at the tariff policy in different countries (see Table 5), we 
find out that almost all follow this compromise, except in the case of very 
small distances. 
Table 5. Relative charges for telegraph circuit leasing. 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czechoslovakia 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Transmission rate 
R rbits/s] 
50 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
75/ 100 200 
1e1.25 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.25 
1.2 
1+1.625 
1.4 
1.6 
1.8 
1.5 
1.6 
The second example deals with another situation. The user seeks to 
minimize costs by consolidating the traffic of h s  terminals and so he asks 
for a single line. The vendor, aware of the user's scheme, leases the line 
for an additional charge. 
Figure 4. Line charges with dependencies upon number of users. 
How can the tariff be set so as to satisfy both the user and the ven- 
dor? We shall again recognize two extreme cases: either the total charge 
does not depend upon the number of additional users or it is purely linear 
(see Figure 4). The general dependency should be placed between the 
two outside extremes. Suppose again that the dependency is also linear: 
where n stands for the number of users and c l  is an initial charge. If 
OSzSl, the parameter z determines the region of our interest (for z = 0, 
the charge is constant; for z = 1 it is purely linearly dependent). It 
should be defined in such a way as to take into consideration the addi- 
tional user's costs 7 for the sharing unit (MUX static or dynamic, concen- 
trator, terminal controller, etc.) and if need be, for other complex 
arrangements (multidrop, direct access, packet switching, etc.) Thus the 
total cost is 
where 71 is the relative cost for a sharing unit related to each additional 
user (for n = 1, C = cl), because the line is not shared). 
The user wants to have 
C<n.cl. 
From this it follows that 
which must be positive. The condition is fulfilled if yl<c l .  For example, if 
3 
we choose z = -then yl should be smaller than 0 . 6 2 5 ~ ~ .  Otherwise shar- 8 
ing the line capacity would be disadvantageous to the user. Thus the 
tariff function depends on the costs of the sharing units and becomes 
dependent on the manufacturer. 
A brief look at  the tariffs shows that in some cases there is a fixed 
additional charge regardless of the number of users, as if n > 1 
(Czechoslovakia). In others, the additional charge depends upon whether 
n = 2 or > 2 (Belgium) or upon the type of users (as in Switzerland where 
the users in different trades are distinguished). No tariffs take into 
account the prices of MUXs and other sharing devices on the market. The 
role of manufacturers should be to adjust their cost policies to fit those of 
the vendors. Thus we come back to the original "three-sided coin". 
5. Conclusion 
The brief remarks on telecommunications costs and benefits given 
above cannot lead to any general conclusions or recommendations. How- 
ever, i t  is possible to make some partial judgments, which in our opinion 
will help in investigating the problem more thoroughly. 
I t  is clear that innovation in telecommunications is needed; its 
benefits are beyond dispute. On the other hand, technological progress is 
more rapid in the telecommunications industry (on the manufacturers' 
side) than in operating telecommunications systems and networks (the 
vendors' side). Not every innovative telecommunication technique and 
device, no matter how sophisticated its level, is immediately imple- 
mented into the network. This is a fact that must be reckoned with. 
However, there are barriers other than technical ones that prevent 
innovation in telecommunications networks. We have mentioned only one: 
the tariff policy and its lack of harmony even within the European range. 
This problem is beginning to be solved; it has been included among six 
priority areas of CEPT efforts (Benedetti 1981). 
Smoothing out tariffs is necessary but it is not enough. New services 
call for a new approach to charge allocation. The present more or less 
complex tariff structures (for details see EURODATA 1981) do not comply 
with even such already "ancient" services as data communications, not to 
mention the new services described in Section 2. One tariff model for 
data communications services was proposed by Ratz an Field (1980). 
This is one way to start tearing down the "Chinese walls" that are 
separating telecommunications vendors, manufacturers, and users, and 
impeding more rapid progress. 
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CONF'LICTS BE'IWEICN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND INNOVATION 
IN INFORMATION 
John R.U. Page  
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
1. Status 
Ths paper is not a report on work carried out in t h s  area: instead, it 
should be regarded as an initial look at  an interdisciplinary area for 
analysis, in whch  two sets of forces intersect, and the result of this inter- 
section will largely determine the path and pace of future developments 
in both. 
The two forces which will concern us are those which channel the 
development of telecommunications services (telecommunications pol- 
icy), and those whch  are responsible for the increasing pace of innova- 
tion in information provision, handling and distribution generally. Policy 
issues in both areas have a large technological content but also involve 
important elements of social and financial concern. In respect of the 
latter, for example, both are big business: we have already seen indica- 
tions of the scale of investment by the PTTs in telecommunications, and 
according to a study commissioned by the UK Government reported in 
the Financial Times of 27th August 1981, the world market in information 
technology amounts to g50 billion. An understanding of the conflicting 
pressures and interactions between these two forces is therefore not 
unimportant from the  general public policy point of view. What follows 
could be regarded as background material for discussion, the object of 
which might be to define a hypothetical study program in this area. 
2. T h e  Telecommunications Services Industry 
One starting point might be to try to identify the particular charac- 
teristics of the telecommunications services industry which have a deter- 
mining effect on telecommunications policy. By "telecommunications 
services industry" is meant those organizations whch provide or assist in 
providing telecommunications services: this will include government min- 
istries, state owned agencies, private companies having either a monopoly 
or a limited franchse to supply telecommunications services, and in 
some sense, equipment manufacturing companies having a "sole-supplier" 
relationshp with a telecommunications administration, agency or car- 
rier. (The influence of sole-supplier arrangements as a possible factor 
narrowing the technological basis for innovation in market economies is 
an interesting topic for speculation). 
The influence of the monopolistic character of the telecommunica- 
tions services industry on the manner in which telecommunications pol- 
icy is made, and its actual content, is clearly central to any project of 
this nature. Differences and similarities between the three basic types of 
monopoly in their effects on policy formulation and its content may also 
be important. The following three classes of monopoly should perhaps be 
considered: 
- Government ministries (directly reporting to the council of min- 
isters or cabinet on policy) 
- Government agencies (with possibly limited independence in 
certain matters, precisely defined by their statutes) 
- Private companies with extensive or limited franchses regu- 
lated by a government agency or ministry, the terms of the 
franchise being subject to continuous review. 
3. Specific Aspects of Telecommunications Policy to be Examined and 
Compared 
The following is a list of some of the points which need to be con- 
sidered in this part of the analysis: 
Def e w e  of Monopoly Powers. 
The terms of the monopoly are usually rather broad, and while sub- 
ject to a legal text, may require interpretation. For example, up to quite 
recently there were problems with so-called message switching in Western 
Europe, i.e., using a terminal attached to one host to send messages to a 
terminal attached to  another host via a computer network. T h s  is in fact 
a theoretical infringement of the monopoly, but if it is allowed a t  all, the 
terms under which this may be done are laid down by the PTT concerned, 
but do not form par t  of the broad-based legislation. The PTT is thus a 
judge in its own case: the same sort of problem may well be resolved dif- 
ferently by other types of monopoly. In Western Europe at  least, the PTTs 
-- and their international consultative body, the CEPT, are still very quick 
to produce a new ruling by way of interpretation of their monopoly 
powers when they feel them threatened by some new development. How- 
ever, there seems a tendency to turn a temporarily blind eye on possible 
infringements when these produce new, semi-experimental service ele- 
ments which the PTTs are not yet ready to provide. Probably one of the 
most noteworthy examples of this was the manner in which the original 
nodes of the TYMNET network were allowed to operate in France, Switzer- 
land, and UK as privately owned termination points of an American net- 
work outside European PTT control. 
Actions in Support of Social Policy Aspects 
The monopolistic nature of the telecommunications services industry 
carries with it the obligat-ion to consider questions of the common good 
(however that may be defined) in addition to matters  of commercial via- 
bility in making services available to the public. A particular example of 
this is in "rate averaging" practi.ced by the large majority of telephone 
services everywhere. In this, while it is recognized that the unit cost of 
providing telephone services in remote or underinhabited locations is 
very different from that of providing services in urban areas, the unit 
prices should be roughly averaged so that the isolated rural user does not 
have to pay the full cost of the service he receives, being subsidized by 
higher rates applied to the urban user. In fact,  the same tactics of 
cross-subsidy are often applied on a broader scale, between services: for 
example profits resulting from high prices to telecommunications users 
are used to subsidize the loss-making postal services, etc. By syphoning- 
off funds for investment such practices can affect the rate of innovation. 
Standardization Policies 
I t  is obviously necessary in a continent like Europe that a policy of 
technical standardization is applied. However, each Administration is a 
sovereign body, and standardization takes much time and effort: although 
this piece of international machinery has been remarkably effective it 
can have two types of effect on technological and service innovation: 
first, in certain respects (facsimile equipment is an  example) too early 
standardization freezes the technology at  a level below the best available; 
second, standardization requires much time, and therefore tends to delay 
entry of new systems and services to the market. 
Accounting an d  Write- Off Policies 
Kimbel (1973) underlined the effect of accounting policies by Euro- 
pean PTTs on the rate of innovation and new equipment design. It turned 
out that ,  (in 1973) that  many PTTs in Western Europe had been following 
the practice for many years of writing-off equipment a t  a rate whch 
resulted in a zero figure in the  books at  the end of 20 years. Replacement 
of equipment, and therefore the entire research and development and 
design cycle had been geared to this write-off policy. T h s  may be con- 
trasted with the much more rapid research and development and design 
cycle in electronics, particularly the computer industry, and the write-off 
policy associated with it in whch  zero book-value is reached in five to  
seven years. Kimbel points out the consequences of this in the relatively 
slow ra te  of introduction of electronic exchanges and computer con- 
trolled load-sharing in Western Europe as compared with the USA in the 
late 60s and early 70s. 
4. Structure and Characteristics of Institutions in Information Technol- 
ogy 
The hypothetical study program would involve looking at the institu- 
tions and organi.zations which constitute the innovative driving force in 
information technology from the point of view of the way they act struc- 
turally and operationally with the telecommunications services industry. 
A t  the production level there is probably very considerable overlap 
between the two, but on a institutional level and from the research an.d 
development side, there appear to be great dissimilarities. 
These dissimilarities are striking in the case of the computer indus- 
try, one of the major innovative components in information technology. 
In place of monopoly there is fierce competition. The industry is strong1.y 
marketing and sales-oriented, whle in the telecommunications services 
industry, the  administrations have only recently begun to think in terms 
of marketing and sales campaigns. The PTTs have a hs tory  of good qual- 
ity research and development going back many decades, but a 
comparison of strategies and financing for research and development as 
between the telecommunications services industries and the computer 
industry should be interesting as a contribution to comparing the innova- 
tive process in both. 
A point requiring study is the non-homogeneity of the institutions, 
firms, and organizations concerned in information technology. Unlike the 
rather monolithic structure in telecommunications, information technol- 
ogy includes at  one end of the spectrum giants such as IBM and at  the 
other very small enterprises based on high technology, but also strongly 
entrepreneurial in character. 
However, within the last few years, there have been indications of 
some degree of convergence in these respects: the development of 
videotex systems by certain telecommunications administrations seems 
to have had some of the characteristics of innovation typified by the com- 
puter industry (research and development hand in hand with an innova- 
tive marketing strategy, entrepreneurial motivation, etc.). Other exam- 
ples of such convergences in the approach of management might be 
sought for and examined in depth. 
5. Interactions and Conflicts 
In one sense, the telecommunications services industry and the 
organizations, etc., concerned with information technology have always 
been closely linked since information transfer is the main purpose of 
telecommunications: however, information technology is also concerned 
with other media for information transfer, and the basic relations 
between the two would repay further review. 
A different type of interaction began to be apparent when telecom- 
munications and computers began to be physically linked in what is now 
sometimes called teleinformatics, and a t  t b s  point conflicts of interest 
emerged. The following are merely pointers to areas which would repay 
study to increase our understanding of the process: 
The "Fore ign  A t tachmen t s"  B a t t l e  
The hierarchcal nature of the telecommunications services industry 
in each country has often involved sole sources of supply, and virtually 
unilateral decisions on equipment deslgn, leaving the customer little or 
no choice in the telecommunications equipment installed on his prem- 
ises. This pattern is in sharp contrast to the fierce competition on peri- 
pherals (terminals, storage devices, etc .) which characterized the early 
days of remote data processing. A move to establish a similar monolithic 
structure of supply in computers and computer peripherals, known as 
"fencing," was viewed with total disfavor and eventually was abandoned. 
The crucial case fought in the USA on "foreign attachments" provided 
the beginnings of a similar breakthrough in peripherals in the teleinfor- 
matics sense. How such conflicts were and are being resolved under dif- 
ferent telecommunications monopoly structures is an important element 
for study. 
Circuit  Costs 
In remote data processing, the telecommunications cost element was 
and is a very substantial par t  of the whole cost of the transaction between 
computer and terminal or computer and computer. The cost of circuits 
either leased, or rented as in the case of a dialed telephone call, was 
naturally solely the business of the telecommunications administration 
concerned. International costs were governed by a complex series of 
CCITT r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  which whle not mandatory, are  primarily 
designed for regulating payments between administrations for interna- 
tional telephone circuits. The hlgh level of charges for circuits for inter- 
national data processing, particularly in Europe, and the arbitrary nature 
of these charges was a source of dissatisfaction in the EDP industry. In 
the USA, there was a greater flexibility owing to the lack of national boun- 
daries but also to the beginnings of a competitive situation brought about 
by successive FCC rulings favoring the entry into the data communica- 
tions market of organizations other than AT&T, as so-called specialized 
carriers and later value added carriers. This resulted in circuit costs five 
to ten times cheaper than for equivalent distances in Europe. 
The Orowth of D a t a  Ne tworks  
One of the results of the successive loosening of the monopoly situa- 
tion on data communications in the USA was the boost given to companies 
specializing in data networks, to whom the telephone common carrier was 
forced to rent  circuits to which the companies concerned added value in 
the shape of packet switching or other facilities. In Europe, computer 
telecommunications could only be provided at that time (the mid-70s) by 
expensive private networks which could only carry the traffic of a single 
organization or a so-called closed user group. Thus, in addition to the 
greater cost of the  circuits themselves, private networks were much 
more costly than their American counterparts because they were unable 
to re-sell the data communications facilities they created to third- 
parties. It was not in fact until EURONET, a cooperative venture between 
a consortium of PTTs and the European Economic Community, became 
operationally possible in the late 70s that Western Europe had any kind of 
cheap data network facilities, limited to a single application, database 
interrogation. This development, whch required agreement on service 
standards and network protocols (and to some extent on charges within 
the network), has rapidly led to national PTT-sponsored data networks, 
internationally connected by gateways. An in-depth comparative study of 
cause and effect in development of data networks in Europe and the  USA 
might throw a great deal of light on how each type of organization of 
monopoly is able to adapt to a rapidly-changing environment. The ques- 
tion may be asked: given that there was very little adaptation to change 
(in the shape of the emerging international data processing in.dustry) 
among the European PTTs in the 60s and early 70s, and that we now note 
an increasingly rapid adaptation to new technologies, new service ideas, 
and other entrepreneurial tendencies, how have such changes in policies 
and management attitudes come about with very little structural change? 
































































































